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Abstract
I develop supermodular implementation in incomplete information. Supermodular
implementable social choice functions (scf) are scf that are Bayesian implementable with
mechanisms that induce a supermodular game. If a mechanism induces a supermodular
game, agents may learn to play some equilibrium in a dynamic setting. The paper has
two parts. The first part is concerned with sufficient conditions for (truthful) supermod-
ular implementability in quasilinear environments. There, I describe a constructive way
of modifying a mechanism so that it supermodularly implements a scf. I prove that, any
Bayesian implementable decision rule that satisfies a joint condition with the valuation
functions, requiring their composition to produce bounded substitutes, is (truthfully) su-
permodular implementable. This joint condition is always satisfied on finite type spaces;
it is also satisfied by C2 decision rules and valuation functions on a compact type space.
Then I show that allocation-efficient decision rules are (truthfully) supermodular im-
plementable with balanced transfers. Third, I establish that C2 Bayesian implementable
decision rules satisfying some dimensionality condition are (truthfully) supermodular im-
plementable with an induced game whose interval prediction is the smallest possible. The
second part provides a Supermodular Revelation Principle.
JEL classification numbers: C72, D78, D83
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1 Introduction
The question of how an equilibrium outcome arises in a mechanism is largely open
in implementation theory and mechanism design. Theoretical and experimental works
have revealed that learning and stability are serious issues in many existing mechanisms.1
This is particularly troublesome, because the idea behind implementation and mecha-
nism design is usually normative and practical in nature: Incentive design explicitly aims
to construct decentralized institutions (mechanisms) that achieve some socially desirable
outcome in equilibrium.
This paper develops supermodular Bayesian implementation. This theory contributes
to the literature on incentives by its explicit purpose and methodology. Supermodular
Bayesian implementation explicitly aims to improve learning and stability in mecha-
nism design. Supermodular implementable scf are scf that are Bayesian (weakly) imple-
mentable with a mechanism that induces a supermodular game. If we think of messages
as real numbers, a supermodular game is a game in which the marginal utility that an
agent receives from playing a bigger message increases as other players also play bigger
messages. In such games, best-responding behaviors are always monotone which helps
boundedly rational agents find their way to equilibrium. Therefore, this theory con-
tributes to fill the important gap in the literature emphasized in Jackson [27]: “Issues
such as how well various mechanisms perform when players are not at equilibrium but
learning or adjusting are quite important [. . . ] and yet have not even been touched by
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Jackson and Preston McAfee, for their help and encouragement. Special thanks are due to Morgan
Kousser, John Ledyard, Thomas Palfrey, Eran Shmaya and David Young for helpful advice and conver-
sations. I also wish to thank Kim Border, Chris Chambers, Bong Chan Koh, Leeat Yariv and seminar
participants at Caltech. The Division of Humanities and Social Sciences at Caltech, Matt Jackson and
Andrea Mattozzi are gratefully acknowledged for financial support.
1Muench and Walker [40] , Cabrales [7] and Cabrales and Ponti [8] show that learning and stability
may be serious issues in (resp.) the Groves-Ledyard [22], Abreu-Matsushima [4] and Sjo¨stro¨m [45]
mechanisms. On the experimental side, Healy [23] and Chen and Tang [12] provide evidence that
convergence may fail to occur in various mechanisms, such as Proportional Tax or the paired-difference
mechanism.
implementation theory. [This topic] has not been looked at from the perspective of de-
signing mechanisms to have nice learning or dynamic properties.”
Contrary to the traditional methodology of mechanism design and implementation,
the mechanisms in this paper derive their learning and stability properties from the game
that they induce and not from the solution concept. One striking feature of the tradi-
tional approach is that it postulates that the solution concept, used by the mechanism
to implement some social choice functions (scf), captures the properties of the mech-
anism. But most solution concepts are subject to criticisms on the basis of learning
and stability. Implementation in dominant strategies and implementation in undomi-
nated strategies are examples.2 Yet recent economic research still concentrates on this
methodology. But why focus on the solution concept? My paper proposes an alternative
approach by using a weak solution concept - Bayesian Nash equilibrium - and by instead
focusing on supermodular games as the class of games induced by the mechanism.
Supermodular games are theoretically appealing in mechanism design and implemen-
tation. Milgrom and Roberts [37] and Vives [52] have shown that, under adaptive learning
dynamics, play in supermodular games ends up in between the least and the greatest Nash
equilibrium. For example, Cournot dynamics, fictitious play and Bayesian learning are
adaptive dynamics. This convergence result extends to the kind of sophisticated learning
dynamics considered in Milgrom and Roberts [38]. Adaptive and sophisticated learn-
ing dynamics encompass such a wide range of backward and forward-looking behaviors
that they confer robustness on supermodular games. In particular, if the equilibrium is
unique, then convergence to the equilibrium is ensured. But supermodular games are also
attractive in an implementation framework because their mixed strategy equilibria are
locally unstable under monotone adaptive dynamics like Cournot dynamics and fictitious
play (Echenique and Edlin [19]). While ruling out mixed strategy equilibria is often un-
satisfactory in implementation theory, it is sensible in supermodular implementation. To
the contrary, many pure-strategy equilibria are stable; in a parameterized supermodular
game, all those equilibria that have monotone comparative statics are stable, such as the
extremal equilibria (Echenique [17]).
Supermodular games and mechanisms that induce such games are supported by strong
experimental evidence. Chen and Gazzale [14] presents experiments on a parameterized
game whose parameter determines the degree of complementarities. They obtain unam-
biguous results that in this game, convergence is significantly better when the parameter
lies in the range where the game is supermodular. In mechanism design, experiments
on the Groves-Ledyard mechanism have shown that convergence is far better when the
punishment parameter is high than when it is low (Chen and Plott [11] and Chen and
Tang [12]). It turns out that the Groves-Ledyard mechanism induces a supermodular
game when the punishment parameter is high. Finally, Healy [23] tests five public goods
mechanisms in a repeated game setting and observes convergence only in those mecha-
nisms that induce a supermodular game.
The centerpiece of my analysis is Theorem 1. It establishes that in quasilinear en-
vironments with real type spaces, any Bayesian implementable scf that satisfies a joint
condition with the valuation functions, requiring their composition to produce bounded
2Implementation in dominant strategies is restrictive and only gives unambiguous learning results
when dominance is strict (Saijo et al. [44], Cason [10]). And implementation in undominated strategies
relies on eliminating weakly dominated strategies, so it has the perverse consequence of excluding limit
points of some learning dynamics (Cabrales [7] and Cabrales and Ponti [8])
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substitutes, is truthfully supermodular implementable. That is, if the joint condition
holds, any Bayesian incentive-compatible scf can be implemented by a direct mechanism
that induces a supermodular game. This joint condition is always satisfied on finite type
spaces; it is also satisfied by twice-continuously differentiable scf and valuation functions
on a compact type space. So, the result is fairly general. Beyond the claim itself, this
theorem describes a constructive way of modifying an existing mechanism so that it su-
permodularly implements a scf. The main insight is that it is always possible to add
complementarities into the transfers without affecting the incentives. The technique is
simple, yet powerful. I explain it formally in the next section in the context of a public
goods example. The intuition is that incentives lie at the expected-value level while com-
plementarities reside in the complete information payoffs. Therefore, adding any function
with null expected value to the transfers does not alter incentives, but may change the
shape of the best-responses. There are functions whose complementarities are strong but
expectation is null.
In quasilinear environments, the mechanism designer is often interested in that there
be no transfers into or out of the system. This is known as the budget balance condi-
tion. It is quite important, because allocation-efficiency and budget balancing imply full
efficiency. Achieving full efficiency is difficult under dominant strategy implementation
(Green and Laffont [21]) but possible under Bayesian implementation (Arrow [5] and
d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet). Theorem 2 shows that budget balancing is also possi-
ble under supermodular Bayesian implementation. Any allocation-efficient decision rule
is supermodular implementable with balanced transfers, if the joint condition of bounded
substitutes is satisfied.
Given supermodular implementation relies on weak implementation, it is as useful as
the bounds represented by the greatest and the least equilibrium are tight. The truthful
equilibrium indeed delivers the desired outcome, but the space between the extremal
equilibria may contain undesired equilibrium outcomes that are limit points of learning
dynamics. If those bounds define a small interval and the scf is continuous, then at least
learning dynamics do not lead to a social outcome that is far from the desired outcome.
I deal with the multiple equilibrium problem by developing optimal and unique super-
modular implementation. Optimal supermodular implementation involves designing a
mechanism whose induced supermodular game generates the weakest complementarities
in the class of mechanisms that supermodularly implement the scf. I prove that this
produces the tightest bounds among those mechanisms (Proposition 2). Therefore, an
optimally supermodular implementable scf cannot admit a direct mechanism that in-
duces a supermodular game with narrower bounds. The main result (Theorem 3) is that
all twice-continuously differentiable and Bayesian implementable scf satisfying some di-
mensionality condition are optimally supermodular implementable on smooth domains.
Unique supermodular implementation defines that situation where the truthful equilib-
rium is the unique equilibrium of the supermodular game induced by a mechanism. All
adaptive dynamics converge (Milgrom and Roberts [37]). Theorem 4 provides sufficient
conditions for unique supermodular implementation.
The paper presents traditional models where supermodular Bayesian implementation
applies and examples where it gives sharp predictions. Supermodular implementation
can be applied to public goods models. In a public goods example with quadratic prefer-
ences (Section 2), a designer uses the expected externality mechanism to implement an
allocation-efficient scf. In the game induced by the mechanism, many learning dynamics
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cycle and fail to converge to the truthful equilibrium. Nevertheless, the mechanism can
be modified to induce a supermodular game where all adaptive dynamics pin down the
truthful equilibrium. Supermodular implementation can also be applied to the tradi-
tional principal-agent problem with hidden information. In a team-production example,3
a principal contracts with a set of agents and monitors their contribution to maximize
net profits. The scf is optimally supermodular implementable and truthtelling is the
unique equilibrium of the supermodular game induced by the mechanism. But there are
applications that are challenging for the present theory. I give examples of binary-choice
models such as auctions and public goods that violate the condition of bounded substi-
tutes. A possible way around this problem is approximate implementation. For those
scf, I show that there exist arbitrarily close scf that are supermodular implementable.
Although quasilinear environments are common in mechanism design and implemen-
tation, it is important to consider general preferences. One of the first questions that
come to mind is that of the restrictiveness of direct mechanisms. Under weak implemen-
tation, the traditional Revelation Principle says that direct mechanisms cause no loss of
generality in dominant strategies or Bayesian equilibrium. Answering the same question
for supermodular implementation is particularly relevant, because the space of mecha-
nisms to consider is very large. The Supermodular Revelation Principle (Theorems 5 and
6) says that if there exists a mechanism that supermodularly implements a scf such that
the range of the equilibrium strategies in the desired equilibrium is a complete lattice,
then there is a direct mechanism that supermodularly implements that scf truthfully. I
give an example of a supermodular implementable scf where this range is not a lattice
and that cannot be supermodularly implemented by any direct mechanism. Thus, the
example suggests that the condition of the theorem is somewhat minimally sufficient.
Although this revelation principle is not as general as the traditional one, it measures
the restriction imposed by direct mechanisms in supermodular implementation and gives
conditions that may warrant their use.
A number of other papers are related to learning and stability in the context of im-
plementation or mechanism design. Chen [13] deserves mention because it is one of the
first papers explicitly aimed at learning and stability in mechanism design. In a complete
information environment with quasilinear utilities, she constructs a mechanism that Nash
implements Lindahl allocations and induces a supermodular game. My paper builds the
framework of supermodular Bayesian implementation and generalizes her result in incom-
plete information. Abreu and Matsushima [3] establishes that for any scf f and ² > 0,
there is an ²-close scf f² for which a mechanism exists where iterative deletion of strictly
dominated strategies leads to a unique profile whose outcome is f².
4 In their terminology,
any scf is virtually implementable in iteratively undominated strategies. The result is
very general and the solution concept is strong enough to predict convergence of many
learning dynamics to the unique equilibrium outcome.5 However, there are arguments
questioning this result on the basis of learning and stability. Cabrales [7] argues that
the concept of virtual implementation is not as innocuous as it first appears. When the
mechanism implements f², it actually implements it in iteratively strictly ²-undominated
strategies. In other words, elimination of weakly dominated strategies is the solution
3This is a simplified version of the team production model of McAfee and McMillan [34].
4Abreu and Matsushima use the Euclidean metric.
5See e.g Milgrom and Roberts [38]. But note that there are games where some adaptive dynamics a`
la Milgrom and Roberts [37] do not converge to a uniquely rationalizable profile.
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concept that underlies the exact-implementation problem for f (See Abreu and Mat-
sushima [4]); virtual implementation is a way of turning it into elimination of strictly
dominated strategies for f². Another weakness of their result is that it does not seem to
extend to infinite sets of types; this issue is related to important theoretical questions
(Duggan [16]) and it is not merely technical. The Abreu-Matsushima mechanism also em-
ploys a message space whose dimension increases to infinity as ² vanishes. In contrast to
Abreu-Matsushima [3], this paper studies exact implementation with direct mechanisms
on finite or infinite type sets. Cabrales [7] demonstrates that there are learning dynamics
that converge to equilibria of the canonical mechanism for Nash implementation. But
those dynamics require players to strictly randomize over all possible improvements on
past play.6 This rules out many natural dynamics considered here. In addition to these
papers, there are general impossibility results on the stability of equilibrium outcomes
in the Nash implementation of Walrasian and Lindahl allocations (Jordan [28] and Kim
[30]).
2 Motivation and Intuition
This section provides an economic example of a designer who uses the expected ex-
ternality mechanism (Arrow [5] and d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet [15]) to implement a
scf. The environment is simple: Two agents with smooth utilities and compact real type
spaces. Yet the mechanism induces a game where learning and stability fail under many
dynamics.
Then I describe a new approach which consists in modifying the existing mechanism
in order to induce a supermodular game. In the example, the benefit is immediate:
All adaptive and sophisticated dynamics converge to the truthful equilibrium, and the
equilibrium is stable.
2.1 A Public Goods Example
Consider a principal who needs to decide the level of a public good, such as the size
of a bridge. Let X = [0, 2] denote the possible values of the public good. There are
two agents, 1 and 2, whose type spaces Θ1 and Θ2 are [0, 1]. Types are independently
uniformly distributed. The agents’ preferences are quasilinear, ui(x, θi) = Vi(x, θi) + ti,
where x ∈ X, θi ∈ Θi, and ti ∈ R is the transfer from the principal to agent i, i = 1, 2.
The valuation functions are V1(x, θ1) = θ1x− x2 and V2(x, θ2) = θ2x+ x2/2.
The principal wants to make an allocation-efficient decision, that is, she aims to max-
imize the sum of the valuation functions by choosing x∗(θ) = θ1 + θ2. Since x∗(.) is
not directly enforceable, the principal will use a mechanism with monetary transfers to
entice the agents to reveal their true type. The principal opts for the expected external-
ity mechanism,7 as it allows direct implementation of allocation-efficient decision rules.
6This feature allows play to exit the integer game when players fallen into it.
7See e.g Section 23.D in Mas-Colell et al. [35].
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Therefore, she sets the transfers as follows:
t1(θˆ1, θˆ2) = Eθ2
[
θ2(θˆ1 + θ2) +
(θˆ1 + θ2)
2
2
]
− Eθ1 [θ1(θ1 + θˆ2)− (θ1 + θˆ2)2]
and
t2(θˆ1, θˆ2) = Eθ1 [θ1(θ1 + θˆ2)− (θ1 + θˆ2)2]− Eθ2
[
θ2(θˆ1 + θ2) +
(θˆ1 + θ2)
2
2
]
.
I will study learning and stability in this example. Time proceeds in discrete periods
t ∈ {0, 1, . . .} and agents are assumed to learn or evolve as time passes, according to
some learning rule. At each time t, the two agents meet with the principal to play the
Bayesian game induced by the expected externality mechanism. The principal initiates
the process. The agents observe the history of play from 0 to t−1 and then publicly play a
strategy. From the strategies played in the past, each agent updates her beliefs about her
opponent’s future strategy using some specified rule; then, given those updated beliefs,
she plays the strategy which maximizes her expected payoffs in the mechanism. Since
the focus here will be on convergence and stability rather on the speed of convergence,
no stopping time is specified.
In this context, a strategy is a deception. A deception for player i at period t is a
function θˆti : Θi → Θi, that is, a player announces some type for each true type.8
The questions are: Will the profile played at t converge to the truthful equilibrium as
t → ∞? If players were in the truthful equilibrium, will they return to this equilibrium
after an exogenous perturbation? The first question asks whether the agents ever learn
to play truthfully and reach an agreement. The second one asks whether truthtelling is
a stable equilibrium.
The players’ best-replies determine the answer. For i = 1, 2, define the set of decep-
tions Σi as the set of measurable functions in Θ
Θi
i and let P(Σi) be the set of (Borel)
probability measures over Σi. Let µ
t
i ∈ P (Σj) be player i’s beliefs about player j’s de-
ceptions at time t. Those beliefs will depend on the history of play and so µti defines the
different learning models. Let brti : Θi → Θi denote player i’s best-reply at time t as a
function of her true type.
For any beliefs µti, player i’s expected utility in the mechanism are strictly concave in
her own announcement. Therefore, computing the first-order condition gives
brt1(θ1) = min{max{θ1 + 1− 2E[Eθ2 [θˆt2(θ2)] |µt1], 0}, 1} (1)
brt2(θ2) = min{max{θ2 −
1
2
+ E[Eθ1 [θˆ
t
1(θ1)] |µt2], 0}, 1}. (2)
where E[.|µti] is an expectation with respect to i’s beliefs µti over Σj.
In the dynamical system given by (1) and (2), if player 1 believes player 2’s strategy
has increased on average, then 1 decreases her strategy twice as much and vice-versa;
whereas 2 tries to match any average-variation in 1’s strategy. This game has a flavor of
“matching-pennies,” and this will be the source of instability and learning deficiency.
Learning often fails to occur in this example. There are many learning dynamics for
8Announcing a deception in the Bayesian game might seem more realistic when type sets are finite
(the example would have similar conclusions in the finite case), but it will come down to choosing an
intercept between -1 and 1.
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which, not only do the agents not converge to truth-revealing, but they are unable to
reach a decision as the play cycles forever. Consider first fictitious play in finite versions
of the example. For simplicity, let Θi be the finite type set {0, .5, 1}, so Σi is finite.
Suppose everything else is unchanged. Consider the model of weighted fictitious play
(See e.g Ho [24]). Deceptions are initially given arbitrary weights and beliefs are updated
by depreciating all weights by 1− φ and adding one to the weight of the opponent’s de-
ception played at t− 1. Here, if players use an identical rule, the profile converges to the
truthful equilibrium unless φ is high enough (φ > .8), in which case cycling occurs. But
there is no reason a priori for both players to use the same learning rule. For asymmetric
rules, learning becomes more uncertain. The player with the highest φ often outweighs
the other one in a non-linear fashion and prevents learning.9
Consider now the original model with continuous types. Cournot dynamics suffers
from cycling and this conclusion holds wherever the principal sets the starting profile
(except truthtelling). Besides, if the agents were to play the truthful equilibrium, the
slightest belief perturbation would destabilize it.
Of course, Cournot dynamics is prone to cycling, since the past only matters through
the last period. But cycling prevails for many families of dynamics with a larger memory
size.10
Learning also fails to occur for other forms of learning dynamics. Adaptive dynamics
do not encompass all rational behaviors, such as forward-looking behaviors. Unfortu-
nately, many sophisticated learning processes a` la Milgrom-Roberts [38] are also plagued
with cycles in the example.
While supermodularity is not necessary for convergence, those learning failures can
be interpreted as a lack of complementarities. It is clear from (1) and (2) that the game
induced by the expected externality mechanism is not supermodular, for the best-replies
cannot be both increasing.
2.2 Intuition in Differentiable Environments
The theory in this paper suggests to transform an existing mechanism into one which
induces a supermodular game. The general transformation technique is simple and effi-
cient. After transforming the mechanism in the previous example, all adaptive dynamics
now converge to the truthful equilibrium, and the equilibrium is stable.
Consider a twice-differentiable environment where f = (x, t) is truthfully Bayesian
implementable.11 I search for transfer functions {tSMi } that solve the following system of
9If 1 learned according to a fictitious play rule with φ1 while 2 used φ2, then the sequence would
enter a cycle for many values of φ1 ≥ .9, φ2 ≥ .55
10Consider dynamics where players only remember the last T periods. They assign a probability φ to
the deception played at t− 1 and (1− φ)δk/C to that played at t− k where C is normalized so that the
probabilities add up to one. Simulations reveal that learning fails under many values of the parameters.
Let (θˆ01(.), θˆ
0
2(.)) be the pair of zero-functions. For T ∈ {2, 3}, δ = .9 and φ ≥ .5, the process enters a
cycle even though the last few periods are weighted almost equally. This suggests that increasing the
memory size may improve learning. For T = 4, δ = .8 and φ ≤ .65, the profile converges to the truthful
equilibrium, but it cycles for φ ≥ .7. A larger memory does not necessarily improve learning, as cycling
reappears when T = {5, 6}, δ = .8 for values of φ below .65.
11A scf is truthfully Bayesian implementable if θ∗i (θi) = θi for all θi and i = 1, . . . , n is a Bayesian
equilibrium of the direct mechanism Γ = (Θ, f).
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equations:
Eθ−i [t
SM
i (., θ−i)] = Eθ−i [ti(., θ−i)], i = 1, . . . , n. (3)
∂2Vi(x
∗
i (θˆi, θˆ−i), θi)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
+
∂2tSMi (θˆi, θˆ−i)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
≥ 0, for all θˆ, θi, i = 1, . . . , n, j 6= i. (4)
Condition (3) says that tSMi and ti have the same expected value when j plays truthfully.
If i’s best-reply under ti was to tell the truth when j played truthfully, then it is still
the case under tSMi . So (x
∗, tSM) is truthfully Bayesian implementable. Condition (4)
demands that the cross-partials of tSMi compensate those of Vi ◦ x∗i , so the induced
Bayesian game is supermodular.12
The main insight of the paper is that it is always possible to add complementarities
into the transfers without affecting the incentives that appear in the expected value
(3). The general transformation technique appears later in the paper, but the following
transfers are an example:
tSMi (θˆ) =
∑
j 6=i
ρiθˆiθˆj + Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)]−
∑
j 6=i
ρiθˆiEθj [θj], i = 1, . . . , n. (5)
Clearly, (5) satisfies (3) for any ρi, i = 1, . . . , n, and ∂
2tSMi (θˆ)/∂θˆi∂θˆj = ρi. If ∂
2Vi(x
∗
i (θˆi,
θˆj), θi)/∂θˆi∂θˆj is bounded below, a property that I call bounded substitutes, then (4)
simply requires finding a real number ρi that exceeds the absolute value of that lower
bound.
In addition to its simplicity, this technique is powerful. The public goods model of
Section 2.1 is an example. There, (x∗, t) is truthfully Bayesian implementable by virtue
of the expected externality mechanism. Since the assumption of bounded substitutes
holds, there exist ρi, i = 1, 2, such that (x
∗, tSM) is supermodular implementable. In
this example, Theorem 4 of Section 5.3 implies that there are values ρ1 and ρ2 for which
truthtelling is the unique equilibrium of the supermodular mechanism. In contrast to
the expected externality mechanism, all adaptive dynamics now converge to the truthful
equilibrium, and the equilibrium is stable.
3 Lattice-theoretic Definitions and Supermodular
Games
The basic definitions of lattice theory in this section are discussed in Milgrom-Roberts
[37] and Topkis [48].
A set M with a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric binary relation º is a lattice if
for any x, y ∈ M , x ∨ y = supM{x, y} and x ∧ y = infM{x, y} exist. It is complete if for
every non-empty subset A of M , infM A and supM A exist. A nonempty subset A of M
is a sublattice if for all x, y ∈ A, x ∨ y, x ∧ y ∈ A. A closed interval [x, y] in M is the set
of m ∈M such that y º m º x. The order-interval topology on a lattice is the topology
12If the complete information payoffs define a supermodular game for each θ ∈ Θ, then the Bayesian
game is supermodular.
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whose subbasis for the closed sets is the set of closed intervals. In Euclidean spaces the
order-interval topology coincides with the usual topology. Lattices are endowed with
their order-interval topology.
For two nonempty subsets A,B of M , A is smaller than B in the strong set order,
denoted A v B, if a ∈ A and b ∈ B imply that a ∧ b ∈ A and a ∨ b ∈ B. Let (Θ,≥) be
a lattice. A correspondence φ : Θ→ M is increasing if for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ with θ′ ≥ θ, we
have φ(θ) v φ(θ′).
Let T be a partially ordered set; g : M → R is supermodular if, for all m,m′ ∈ M ,
g(m) + g(m′) ≤ g(m ∧ m′) + g(m ∨ m′); g : M × T → R has increasing (decreasing)
differences in (m, t) if, whenever m º m′ and t º t′, g(m, t) − g(m′, t) ≥ (≤)g(m, t′) −
g(m′, t′); g :M × T → R satisfies the single-crossing property in (m, t) if, whenever m º
m′ and t º t′, g(m′′, t′) ≥ g(m′, t′) implies g(m′′, t′′) ≥ g(m′, t′′) and g(m′′, t′) > g(m′, t′)
implies g(m′′, t′′) > g(m′, t′′). If g has decreasing differences in (m, t), then variables m
and t are said to be substitutes. If g has increasing differences or satisfies the single-
crossing property in (m, t), then m and t are said to be complements.
A game is described by (N, {(Mi,ºi)}, u), where N is a finite set of players, and
each player i ∈ N has a strategy space Mi with an order ºi and a payoff function
ui :
∏
i∈N Mi → R such that u = (ui).
Definition 1 A game G = (N, {(Mi,ºi)}, u) is supermodular if for all i ∈ N ,
1. (Mi,ºi) is a complete lattice;
2. ui is bounded, supermodular in mi for each m−i and has increasing differences in
(mi,m−i);
3. ui is upper-semicontinuous in mi for each m−i, and continuous in m−i for each mi.
4 The Framework of Supermodular Bayesian Imple-
mentation
Let N = {1, . . . n} denote a collection of agents, indexed by i and j. A collective
planner faces a set Y of alternatives, with generic element y ∈ Y from which the planner
must choose. Let Y be equipped with σ-algebra Y . For each agent i ∈ N , let Θi be the
set of i’s possible types equipped with σ-algebra Fi. Let Θ =
∏
i∈N Θi be equipped with
σ-algebra F = ×i∈NFi. Agents have a common prior φ on (Θ,F) known to the planner.
The planner’s desired outcomes are represented by a social choice function f : Θ→ Y
that is F -measurable.
A mechanism is a tuple Γ = ({(Mi,ºi)}, g) where agent i’s message space Mi is
endowed with an order ºi and an underlying σ-algebra Mi; letting M = ×i∈NMi,
g : M → Y is an outcome function that is M-measurable. A strategy for agent i is a
measurable function mi : Θi → Mi. Denote by Σi(Mi) the set of equivalence classes of
measurable functions from (Θi,Fi) to Mi. This set is endowed with the pointwise order,
also denoted ºi. A direct mechanism is one for which eachMi = Θi,Mi = Fi and g = f .
In this case, Σi(Θi) is called the set of i’s deceptions and its elements are denoted θˆi(.).
Direct mechanisms vary by the order on type spaces.
Each agent i’s preferences over alternatives are given by a utility function ui : Y ×
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Θi → R that is Y × Fi-measurable. These utility functions are uniformly bounded by
some u. For any h : Θ→ R, denote Eθ[h(θ)] =
∫
Θ
h(θ)dφ(θ). For m−i(.) ∈
∏
j 6=iΣj(Θj),
agent i’s preferences over strategy profiles in Σi(Θi) are given by i’s ex-ante payoffs,
defined as
ugi (mi(.),m−i(.)) = Eθ[ui(g(mi(θi),m−i(θ−i)), θi)].
When types are independently distributed, let φ = ×φi where φi is defined on (Θi,Fi).
For any h : Θ−i → R, denote Eθ−i [h(θ−i)] =
∫
Θ−i
h(θ−i)dφ−i(θ−i). For mi ∈ Mi and
m−i(.) ∈
∏
j 6=iΣj(Θj), agent i’s interim payoffs at type θi are Eθ−i [ui(g(mi,m−i(θ−i))
, θi)]. Player i’s ex-ante payoffs can be written
ugi (mi(.),m−i(.)) =
∫
Θi
Eθ−i [ui(g(mi,m−i(θ−i)), θi)] dφi(θi).
The Bayesian game induced by mechanism Γ is G = (N, {(Σi(Mi),ºi)}, ug) where
ug = (ugi ) is the vector of ex-ante payoffs. If a scf is Bayesian implementable with a
mechanism that induces a supermodular game, then it is supermodular implementable
in the sense defined next.
Definition 2 The mechanism Γ supermodularly implements the scf f(.) if there exists a
Bayesian equilibrium m∗(.) such that g(m∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, and if the induced
game G is supermodular. The scf f is said to be supermodular Bayesian implementable.
Definition 3 A scf is truthfully supermodular Bayesian implementable (TSBI) if there
exists a direct mechanism that supermodularly implements the scf f(.) such that θˆ(θ) = θ
for all θ ∈ Θ is a Bayesian equilibrium.
The Bayesian game G is formulated in its ex-ante version as opposed to interim.
Beyond the traditional arguments contrasting those two versions, there are important
technical differences between ex-ante and interim supermodular Bayesian games (Van
Zandt [50]). In particular, the results in Milgrom-Roberts [37] can only be directly
applied to the ex-ante version G.
5 Supermodular Implementation on Quasilinear Do-
mains
This section deals with supermodular implementation when agents have quasilinear
utility functions. The objective is to give general conditions under which a scf is TSBI
and the mechanism satisfies some further requirements. There are four main results.
The first provides general conditions for supermodular implementability. The second
answers the question of supermodular implementation and budget balancing. The third
gives sufficient conditions for a scf to be TSBI in a game form whose interval between
extremal equilibria is the smallest possible. The fourth offers sufficient conditions for
unique supermodular implementation.
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5.1 Environment and Definitions
An alternative y is a vector (x, t1, . . . , tn) where x is an element of a compact set X ⊂
Rm and ti ∈ R for all i. Each agent i has a type space Θi ⊂ R (finite or infinite). Endow
Θi with the usual order. Notice that Σi(Θi) is a complete lattice with the pointwise
order.13
The set Xi is a compact subset of Rmi such that
∏
i∈N Xi = X. For all i ∈ N ,
preferences are quasilinear with Bernoulli utility function ui(x, θi) = Vi(xi, θi) + ti where
xi ∈ Xi and ti ∈ R. The function Vi : Xi × Θi → R is called i’s valuation function.
Denote V = (Vi)i∈N .
In this environment, a scf f = (x, t) is composed of a decision rule x : Θ 7→ (xi(θ))
where xi : Θ → Xi, and transfer functions ti : Θ → R. Typically, x(.) represents the
desired outcomes while transfers are chosen by the planner.
Say that V and x(.) are C2, if there exist open sets Oi ⊃ Θi and Ui ⊃ Xi, i = 1, . . . , n,
such that V : Ui ×Oi → R and x :
∏
i∈N Oi → Ui are C2.
Define the continuous family of decision rules and valuation functions as
Fcont = {(V , x(.)) : V :(x, θ) 7→ (Vi(xi, θi)), Vi is bounded, Vi(xi(θˆ), θi) is continuous in
θˆ−i for fixed θˆi, θi and Vi(xi(θˆ), θi) is usc in θˆi for fixed θˆ−i, θi, for all i ∈ N}.
Agents’ types are assumed to be independently distributed. For all i ∈ N , the
distribution of i’s types admits a bounded density with full support.
Here a scf f is TSBI if, in the direct mechanism with the usual order ≥i on R,
truthtelling is a Bayesian equilibrium.
The following definitions concern the composition of the valuation functions and the
scf. For any θ′i, θ
′′
i ∈ Θi, let
∆Vi((θ
′′
i , θ
′
i), θˆ−i, θi) = Vi(xi(θ
′′
i , θˆ−i), θi)− Vi(xi(θ′i, θˆ−i), θi).
Say that (V, x) has bounded substitutes or that Vi◦xi has substitutes bounded by Ti, if for
all i ∈ N , there is Ti ∈ R such that, for all θ′′i ≥ θ′i and θ′′−i ≥ θ′−i, ∆Vi((θ′′i , θ′i), θ′′−i, θi)−
∆Vi((θ
′′
i , θ
′
i), θ
′
−i, θi) ≥ Ti(θ′′i − θ′i)
∑
j 6=i(θ
′′
j − θ′j) for all θi ∈ Θi. Consider the case where
N = {1, 2} as an illustration. The condition means that there exists a real number
such that, as (say) agent 2 increases her announcement, the marginal valuation that
agent 1 receives from increasing her announcement can decrease by no more than the
product between that real number and the increase in each agent’s announcement.14
In twice-continuously differentiable environments, the condition simply means that the
cross-partial derivatives, ∂2Vi(xi(θˆ), θi)/∂θˆi∂θˆj, are uniformly bounded below. Hence it
requires that if agents’ announcements are strategic substitutes in the game with no
transfers,15 then at least they are boundedly so. Notice that this assumption is always
satisfied when type sets are finite. Moreover, it is also satisfied whenever the decision
rule xi(.) and the valuation functions Vi are C
2-functions for all i on compact type sets.
The pair (V, x) has bounded complements if (−V, x) has bounded substitutes. Like-
wise, say that ui ◦f has bounded complements if the previous definition is satisfied when
transfers are included.
13See Lemma 1 in Van Zandt [50].
14Recall Section 2.2.
15See Section 3
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The pair (Vi, xi) is ω-Lipschitz in θˆi if there exists ω > 0 such that for all θˆ−i and θi,
∆Vi((θ
′′
i , θ
′
i), θˆ−i, θi) ≤ ω(θ′′i − θ′i), for all θ′′i ≥ θ′i. The same definition applies to transfer
functions. In differentiable environments, it simply means that the corresponding first-
derivatives are bounded above.
The valuation functions V and decision rule x(.) have δ-increasing differences if for
each i ∈ N , there is δi > 0 such that for all θˆ′′i ≥ θˆ′i and θ′′i ≥ θ′i, Eθ−i [∆Vi((θˆ′′i , θˆ′i), θ−i, θ′′i )]
− Eθ−i [∆Vi((θˆ′′i , θˆ′i), θ−i, θ′i)] ≥ δi(θˆ′′i − θˆ′i)(θ′′i − θ′i).
5.2 General Result and Implementation with Budget Balance
This subsection contains two main results. The characterization theorem deals with
supermodular Bayesian implementability on quasilinear families. Basically, if the decision
rule and the utility functions are relatively well-behaved, in the sense of Fcont and bounded
substitutes, then a decision rule is Bayesian implementable with transfers if and only if
it is supermodular Bayesian implementable with transfers. The second theorem provides
sufficient conditions to satisfy budget balancing.
Theorem 1 Let (V, x) ∈ Fcont. If (V, x) has bounded substitutes, then there exist trans-
fers t such that the scf f = (x, t) is TBI and Eθ−i [ti(., θ−i)] is usc, if and only if, there
are transfers tSM such that (x, tSM) is TSBI and Eθ−i [t
SM
i (., θ−i)] is usc. Moreover, the
transfers have the same expected value: Eθ−i [ti(., θ−i)] = Eθ−i [t
SM
i (., θ−i)].
Proof: Sufficiency is immediate. Suppose that f = (x, t) is TBI and transfers t are
truthfully-usc. Then,
Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θi, θ−i), θi)] + Eθ−i [ti(θi, θ−i)] ≥ Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)] + Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] (6)
for all θˆi. For ρi ∈ R, let
δi(θˆi, θˆ−i) =
∑
j 6=i
ρiθˆiθˆj, (7)
and define
tSMi (θˆi, θˆ−i) = δi(θˆi, θˆ−i) + Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)]− Eθ−i [δi(θˆi, θ−i)]. (8)
Note that Eθ−i [t
SM
i (θˆi, θ−i)] = Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] for all θˆi. Thus (x, t
SM) is TBI by (6).
Moreover, δi : Θ→ R is continuous and bounded. So, it follows from the Bounded Con-
vergence Theorem that Eθ[δi(θˆi(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))− Eθ−i [δi(θˆi(θi), θ−i)]] is continuous in θˆ(.).
Since transfers t are truthfully-usc, Fatou’s Lemma implies that Eθ[t
SM
i (θˆi(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))]
is usc in θˆi(.) for each θˆ−i(.). Therefore, payoffs u
g
i satisfy the continuity requirements for
supermodular games. Next I show that it is possible to choose ρi so that u
g
i has increas-
ing differences in (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)). By bounded substitutes, there exists Ti such that, for all
θ′′i ≥ θ′i and θ′′−i ≥ θ′−i, ∆Vi((θ′′i , θ′i), θ′′−i, θi)−∆Vi((θ′′i , θ′i), θ′−i, θi) ≥ Ti(θ′′i − θ′i)
∑
(θ′′j − θ′j)
for all θi ∈ Θi. Set ρi > −Ti. Choose any θ′′i ≥i θ′i and θ′′−i ≥−i θ′−i. The function
ui(xi(θˆi, θˆ−i), θi) has increasing differences in (θˆi, θˆ−i) for each θi, if the following expres-
sion is positive for all θi,
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Vi(xi(θ
′′
i , θ
′′
−i), θi) + Vi(xi(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i),θi)− Vi(xi(θ′′i , θ′−i),θi)− Vi(xi(θ′i, θ′′−i),θi)
+
∑
j 6=i
ρi
(
θ′′i θ
′′
j + θ
′
iθ
′
j − θ′′i θ′j − θ′iθ′′j
)
. (9)
Given ρi > −Ti, (9) is greater than
Vi(xi(θ
′′
i , θ
′′
−i), θi) + Vi(xi(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), θi)− Vi(xi(θ′′i , θ′−i), θi)− Vi(xi(θ′i, θ′′−i), θi)
− Ti(θ′′i − θ′i)
∑
j 6=i
(θ′′j − θ′j). (10)
Bounded substitutes immediately imply that (10) is positive for all θi, hence so is (9).
By Lemma 1, the utility function ugi has increasing differences in (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)). Finally,
since Θi is a chain, Lemma 1 implies u
g
i is supermodular in θˆi(.). Q.E.D
Theorem 1 shows that the class of Bayesian implementable scf that can be supermod-
ularly implemented in Bayesian equilibrium is large, as there are only mild boundedness
and continuity conditions on the utility functions and the scf. The heart of the result is
(8): It is always possible to add complementarities into the transfers without affecting
the incentives that appear in the expected value.
Remark. Since players receive the same expected utility in equilibrium from (x, t) and
(x, tSM), if (x, t) satisfies some interim participation constraints, then so does (x, tSM).
Recall that, if type spaces are finite, then the assumptions of bounded substitutes and
continuity are trivially satisfied for all valuation functions and scf. Furthermore, if V and
x(.) are twice-continuously differentiable on a compact type set, then the assumptions of
bounded substitutes and continuity are satisfied. This leads to the following important
corollaries which cover cases of interest.
Corollary 1 Let type spaces Θi be finite subsets of R. For any valuation functions V , if
the scf f = (x, t) is TBI, then there exist transfers tSM such that (x, tSM) is TSBI.
Corollary 2 Let V be C2 and the scf f = (x, t) be such that x(.) is C2. If f is TBI and
Eθ−i [ti(., θ−i)] is usc, then there exist transfers t
SM such that (x, tSM) is TSBI.
The previous results state conditions that apply to TBI scf. In some instances it may
not be obvious whether the decision rule admits truthfully-usc transfers leading to im-
plementation. Therefore, I provide a proposition which identifies sufficient conditions for
a decision rule to generate such transfers.
Standard implementation results in differentiable quasilinear environments16 demon-
strate that transfers which are part of a TBI scf have an explicit expected value when
the other agents play truthfully. From (8), this will lead to explicit transfers that allow
supermodular implementation. Letting Θi = [θi, θi] for i ∈ N , a necessary condition for
Bayesian implementation is
Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] = −Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θˆi)] +
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Eθ−i [Vi(xi(s, θ−i), s)]
∂θi
ds+ ²i(θi) (11)
16See e.g Mas Colell et al. [35] for linear utility functions.
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where ²i(θi) is some constant. Combining Theorem 1 and Proposition 6 of Section 9.1
yields explicit sufficient conditions for supermodular Bayesian implementability as shown
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If (V, x) ∈ Fcont has bounded substitutes such that Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)]
is continuous in (θˆi, θi) and ∂Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)]/∂θi is increasing in θˆi, then there are
transfers tSM such that (x, tSM) is TSBI.
To identify the decision rules that are TSBI with transfers, Proposition 1 suggests to
choose those decision rules x(.) that lead each agent i’s expected marginal valuation to
be nondecreasing. Then, any such decision rule is TSBI with transfers tSM combining
(8) and (11).
The rest of this section investigates supermodular implementation under the budget
balance condition. In some design problems, the planner should not realize a net gain
from the mechanism. While the planner cannot sustain deficits, full efficiency requires
there be no waste of nume´raire. A scf is fully efficient if it maximizes the sum of the
utility functions (not only the valuation functions) subject to the feasibility constraint∑
ti ≤ 0. The transfers then add up to zero for each vector of true types.
The next theorem provides sufficient conditions for a scf to be TSBI using balanced
transfers. Say that a decision rule x is allocation-efficient, if x(θ) ∈ argmaxx∈X
∑
i∈N Vi(
xi, θi) for all θ ∈ Θ. Basically, there exist transfers such that any allocation-efficient
decision rule is supermodular implementable and fully efficient if substitutes are bounded.
Theorem 2 Let n ≥ 3. Consider an allocation-efficient decision rule x(.). If (V, x) ∈
Fcont and has bounded substitutes, then there exist balanced transfers tBB such that the
scf f = (x, tBB) is TSBI.
The proof appears in Section 9.1 and it is constructive. Transfers tBB correspond to
a transformation of the transfers in the expected externality mechanism, and they rely
on two observations. First, any player’s transfer in the expected externality mechanism
displays no complementarities or substitutes between that player’s announcement and
her opponents’. Second, there is a transformation of the transfers similar to that in The-
orem 1 that enables to add complementarities while preserving incentives and budget
balancing.
Theorem 2 can be extended to situations where, for every realization of types, enough
transfers (taxes) are raised to pay the cost of x. The budget constraint takes the form∑
i∈N ti(θ) ≥ C(x(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ where C is the cost function mapping X into R+.
An additional sufficient condition to apply the theorem is that (C, x) has bounded sub-
stitutes.17
17See e.g Lemma 2 in Ledyard and Palfrey [33] for transfers satisfying this budget balance condition.
Note that these transfers are separable in types except (possibly) for C(x(θ)), so they have are no
complementarities or substitutes beyond those contained in C(x(θ)).
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5.3 Optimal and Unique Supermodular Implementation
This subsection deals with the multiple equilibrium problem in supermodular im-
plementation. Even if a mechanism has an equilibrium outcome with some desirable
property, it may have other equilibrium outcomes that are undesirable. The concept of
supermodular implementation relies on weak implementation, while the results in Mil-
grom and Roberts [37] promise that adaptive dynamics lead to play between the greatest
and the least equilibrium. This interval between the extremal equilibria is called the in-
terval prediction. So, players may learn to play an untruthful equilibrium associated with
a bad outcome. Therefore, it is important to minimize the size of the interval prediction
and to take the number of equilibria into consideration. Supermodular implementation
is particularly powerful when truth-revealing is the unique equilibrium.
Before presenting the results, I discuss the new concepts of this subsection. Think of
the degree of complementarities as being increasing with the cross-partial derivatives, and
vice-versa. Optimal supermodular implementation involves designing a mechanism whose
induced supermodular game has the weakest complementarities in a wide class of mech-
anisms that supermodularly implement the scf. This mechanism turns out to produce
the smallest interval prediction in this class of supermodular mechanisms. Furthermore,
the interval prediction is a singleton if and only if there is a unique Bayesian equilibrium.
Unique supermodular implementation describes that situation where truthtelling is the
unique equilibrium of the supermodular induced game.
I begin with the definition of an order used in the definition of optimal supermod-
ular implementation. As mentioned above, the cross-partial derivatives offer a way of
measuring complementarities in twice-differentiable environments. It is natural to say
that transfer functions t˜ generate larger complementarities than t, denoted t˜ ºID t, if
∂2t˜i(θˆ)/∂θˆi∂θˆj ≥ ∂2ti(θˆ)/∂θˆi∂θˆj for all θˆ, j and i. For example, transfers defined by (7)
and (8) generate more complementarities as ρi increases. The next definition formalizes
the idea of the degree of complementarities and extends it to non-differentiable transfer
functions.
Definition 4 Define the ordering relation ºID on the space of transfer functions such
that t˜ ºID t if, for all i ∈ N and for all θ′′i > θ′i and θ′′−i >−i θ′−i, t˜i(θ′′i , θ′′−i)− t˜i(θ′′i , θ′−i)−
t˜i(θ
′
i, θ
′′
−i) + t˜i(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i) ≥ ti(θ′′i , θ′′−i)− ti(θ′′i , θ′−i)− ti(θ′i, θ′′−i) + ti(θ′i, θ′−i).
Transfers t˜ are larger than t with respect to ºID if the double-differences are increasing
from each ti to t˜i.One canverify that, for twice-differentiable transfers, it means that the
cross-partial derivatives of each t˜i are larger than those of ti.
While ºID is transitive and reflexive on the space of transfer functions, it is not anti-
symmetric. Consider the set of ºID-equivalence classes of transfers, denoted T .18
The next proposition shows that if a transfer function generates more complemen-
tarities than another transfer function, then the former induces a game whose interval
prediction is larger than that of the game induced by the latter. This result is also of
interest for the theory of supermodular games, as it relates the degree of complementar-
ities to the size of the interval prediction.
For any t ∈ T and TSBI (x, t), let θt(.) and θt(.) be (resp.) the greatest and the
smallest equilibrium in the game induced by (x, t).
18Any quasi-order is transformed into a partially ordered set using equivalence classes.
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Proposition 2 Let (V, x) be such that Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)] is continuous in (θˆi, θi).
For any TSBI scf (x, t′′) and (x, t′) such that t′′, t′ ∈ T , if t′′ ºID t′, then [θt′(.), θt′(.)] ⊂
[θt
′′
(.), θt
′′
(.)].
Proof: Let (x, t′′) and (x, t′) be any TSBI scf such that t′′, t′ ∈ T . By Proposition
6 of Section 9.1, all transfers ti such that (x, t) is TSBI must have the same expected
value Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] up to a constant. Therefore, those transfers can all be written as
ti(θˆi, θˆ−i) = δi(θˆi, θˆ−i) − Eθ−i [δi(θˆi, θ−i)] + Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] for some function δi : Θ → R.
For any TSBI scf, the induced game has a smallest and a greatest equilibrium along with
a truthful equilibrium in between. Let θTi (.) denote player i’s truthful strategy, that is,
θTi (θi) = θi for all θi. Let G` and Gu be the game G where the strategy spaces are restricted
(resp.) from Σi(Θi) to [inf Σi(Θi), θ
T
i (.)], and from Σi(Θi) to [θ
T
i (.), supΣi(Θi)]. Since
closed intervals are sublattices and G is supermodular, those modified games G` and Gu
are supermodular games. Moreover, G` must have the same least equilibrium as game
G and the truthful equilibrium is its largest equilibrium. Likewise, Gu has the same
greatest equilibrium as game G and the truthful equilibrium is its smallest equilibrium.
Let ufi (θˆ(.), t) = Eθ[Vi(xi(θˆ(θ)), θi)]+Eθ[ti(θˆ(θ))]. I show that (i) In G`, ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.), t)
has decreasing differences in (θˆi(.), t) for each θˆ−i(.) and (ii) In Gu, ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.), t) has
increasing differences in (θˆi(.), t) for each θˆ−i(.). In those modified games, this answers
how the untruthful extremal equilibrium varies in response to changes in transfers with
respect to ºID. First consider G`. Let δ′′ and δ′ be the δ-functions corresponding to
t′′ and t′. For any deception θˆ−i(.), note θˆj(θj) ≤ θj for all θj and j 6= i. Choose any
θ′′i (.) > θ
′
i(.) and note t
′′ ºID t′ implies δ′′ ºID δ′. Hence for all i ∈ N ,
Eθ[δ
′′
i (θ
′′
i (θi), θ−i)− δ′′i (θ′′i (θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))]− Eθ[δ′′i (θ′i(θi), θ−i)− δ′′i (θ′i(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))]−
− Eθ[δ′i(θ′′i (θi), θ−i)− δ′i(θ′′i (θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))] + Eθ[δ′i(θ′i(θi), θ−i)− δ′i(θ′i(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))] ≥ 0
(12)
Note (12) is equivalent to
ufi (θ
′′
i (.), θˆ−i(.), t
′′)+ufi (θ
′
i(.), θˆ−i(.), t
′)−ufi (θ′′i (.), θˆ−i(.), t′)−ufi (θ′i(.), θˆ−i(.), t′′) ≤ 0 (13)
for each θˆ−i(.). So, (13) implies that u
f
i (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.), t) has decreasing differences in
(θˆi(.), t) for each θˆ−i(.). It follows from Theorem 6 in Milgrom-Roberts [37] that the
smallest equilibrium in G` is decreasing in t. The same argument applies to Gu. There,
all deceptions θˆ−i(.) are such that θˆj(θj) ≥ θj for all θj and j 6= i. As a result, the sign
in (12) is reversed, which implies ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.), t) has increasing differences in (θˆi(.), t)
for each θˆ−i(.). The greatest equilibrium in Gu is thus increasing in t. Q.E.D
Before defining optimal supermodular implementation, consider the following family
of transfers,
T = {t ∈ T : ti(θ′′i , θ′′−i)−ti(θ′′i , θ′−i)− ti(θ′i, θ′′−i)+ti(θ′i, θ′−i) ≥ ∆Vi((θ′′i , θ′i), θ′−i, θi)
−∆Vi((θ′′i , θ′i), θ′′−i, θi) for all θ′′i > θ′i, θ′′−i >−i θ′−i, θi, i ∈ N}.
Transfers in T make the complete information payoffs supermodular for each type θ ∈ Θ.
If a scf is TSBI and its transfers offer the weakest complementarities in T, then it is
optimally supermodular implementable in the sense defined next.19
19The ex-ante Bayesian game must be supermodular whereas transfer functions are defined at the
complete information level. So it is not necessary that transfers t be in T in order for a scf to be TSBI.
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Definition 5 A scf f = (x, t∗) is optimally TSBI if it is TSBI and t ºID t∗ for all
transfers t ∈ T such that (x, t) is TBI.
The rationale behind optimal supermodular implementation is twofold. Games with
strategic complementarities have a coordination-game “flavor” that leads to multiple
equilibria (Takahashi [46]), and this relationship can be traced to how strong comple-
mentarities are. Adding complementarities improves learning and stability, but too much
complementarity may yield untruthful equilibria. Optimal supermodular implementation
is the best compromise. In addition, if we want to supermodularly implement the deci-
sion rule with transfers in T, then Proposition 2 implies that optimal transfers generate
the tightest interval prediction.
Say that a scf x : Θ 7→ (xi(θ)) is dimensionally reducible if, for each i ∈ N , there
are C2 functions hi : R2 → Xi and ri :
∏
j 6=iΘj → R such that ri(.) is increasing and
xi(θ) = hi(θi, ri(θ−i)) for all θ ∈ Θ. The condition is trivially true when there are two
individuals. If there are more, the announcements of each player’s opponents must enter
every dimension of that player’s scf through a real-valued aggregate.
The next theorem says that, in twice-continuously differentiable environments, a scf
is optimally supermodular implementable if it is is TBI and if its decision rule is dimen-
sionally reducible.
Theorem 3 Let V be C2 and f = (x, t) be a scf such that x : Θ 7→ (xi(θ)) is reducible.
If f is TBI and transfers t are such that Eθ−i [ti(., θ−i)] is usc, then there are transfers t
∗
such that (x, t∗) is optimally TSBI and Eθ−i [t
∗
i (., θ−i)] = Eθ−i [ti(., θ−i)].
Proof: Suppose f = (x, t) is TBI. Letting
δi(θˆi, θˆ−i) = −
∫ θˆi
θi
∫ ri(θˆ−i)
ri(θ−i)
min
θi∈Θi
∂2Vi(hi(si, ri), θi)
∂ri∂si
dri dsi (14)
for all θˆ ∈ Θ, I show that
t∗i (θˆi, θˆ−i) = δi(θˆi, θˆ−i)− Eθ−i [δi(θˆi, θ−i)] + Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] (15)
is well-defined and that (x, t∗) is optimally TSBI. Since Vi and hi are C2 on an open
set containing compact set Θi, minθi∈Θi ∂
2Vi(hi(si, ri), θi)/∂ri∂si exists, is continuous in
(ri, si) by the Maximum Theorem and it is bounded. Hence δi : Θ→ R is continuous,20
which implies that δi is Borel-measurable. Since δi is also bounded, Eθ−i [δi(., θ−i)] is
well-defined and so is t∗i : Θ → R. Next I prove that (x, t∗) is optimally TSBI. Note
Eθ−i [t
∗
i (θˆi, θ−i)] = Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] and thus (x, t
∗) is TBI. As a continuous function on a
compact set, δi is uniformly continuous in θˆ. So, Eθ[t
∗(θˆ(θ))] is continuous in θˆ−i(.), and
For example, if the prior is mostly concentrated on some subset Θ∗ of Θ, it may not be necessary to
make the complete information payoffs supermodular for types in Θ\Θ∗. Of course, the possibility of
neglecting Θ\Θ∗ depends on how unlikely that set is compared to how negative the cross-partials may
be for types in that set. Therefore, I work with the condition to be in T.
20See e.g Theorem 6.20 in Rudin [43].
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upper-semicontinuity of Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] implies Eθ[t
∗
i (θˆ(θ))] is usc in θˆi(.). By construc-
tion, t∗i is twice-differentiable
21 and
∂2t∗i (θˆi, θˆ−i)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
=
∂2δi(θˆi, θˆ−i)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
=
∂
∂θˆj
∫ ri(θˆ−i)
ri(θ−i)
− min
θi∈Θi
∂2Vi(hi(θˆi, ri), θi)
∂ri∂si
dri
= −
(
min
θi∈Θi
∂2Vi(hi(θˆi, ri(θˆ−i)), θi)
∂ri∂si
)
∂ri(θˆ−i)
∂θˆj
. (16)
Because
− min
θi∈Θi
∂2Vi(xi(θˆi, θˆ−i), θi)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
= − min
θi∈Θi
(
∂2Vi(hi(θˆi, ri(θˆ−i)), θi)
∂ri∂si
∂ri(θˆ−i)
∂θˆj
)
(17)
and ri(.) is an increasing function, (16) and (17) are equal. Thus ∂
2[Vi(xi(θˆ), θi) +
t∗i (θˆ)]/∂θˆi∂θˆj ≥ 0 for all θˆ, θi and j, i, and so (x, t∗) is TSBI. Moreover, for all transfers
t ∈ T such that (x, t) is TBI, it must be that
∂2ti(θˆ)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
≥ − min
θi∈Θi
∂2Vi(xi(θˆi, θˆ−i)), θi)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
=
∂2t∗i (θˆ)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
for all θˆ and j, i. This implies that (x, t∗) is optimally TSBI. Q.E.D
When the truthful equilibrium is unique, supermodular implementation is one of the
most powerful forms of implementation in terms of learning and stability (Milgrom and
Roberts [37]). After studying optimal supermodular implementation, it is natural to look
for conditions for the interval prediction to be a singleton.
Definition 6 A scf f = (x, t) is uniquely TSBI if it is TSBI and the truthful equilibrium
is the unique Bayesian equilibrium.
The next theorem gives sufficient conditions for a scf to be uniquely supermodular im-
plementable. Recall the definitions of Section 5.1. In particular, note that δ-increasing
differences strengthen the condition of Proposition 1 that the marginal expected value
is increasing in a player’s announcement. Here, the marginal expected value is “suf-
ficiently” increasing. For example, it is satisfied in environments where the valuation
functions have “sufficiently” increasing differences in type and outcome and the scf is
increasing enough in a player’s announcement.
The main result on unique supermodular implementation is Theorem 4. If truthtel-
ling is an equilibrium and if the mechanism induces utility functions whose complemen-
tarities between announcements are smaller than the complementarities between own
announcement and type, then the truthful equilibrium is unique.22
Theorem 4 Let V and scf f = (x, t) be such that (V, x) has δ-increasing differences.
Let Vi be C
1, xi be differentiable in θˆi, and Vi ◦ xi be ωi-Lipschitz in θˆi. Suppose ui ◦ f
has complements bounded by κi and transfers ti are βi-Lipschitz in θˆi. If f is TSBI and
κi < δi/(n− 1), then it is uniquely TSBI.
21See previous footnote.
22My results are inspired by recent theories of uniqueness in Bayesian games (Mason and Valentinyi
[36]).
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The proof appears in Section 9.1, but the intuition is as follows. On the one hand,
for high values of δi, the complementarities between own announcement and type are so
strong that players tend to announce high types regardless of their opponents’ deceptions.
This favors uniqueness. On the other hand, for high values of κi, the complementarities
between players’ announcements become so strong that it is source of multiplicity (See
the above argument). The theorem provides a cutoff between those forces so that, for
any profile greater/smaller than the truthful equilibrium, some player has a contractive
best-reply between that profile and the truthful one.
Optimal transfers provide the lowest bound on complements (κ), so a natural question
is to ask when they actually lead to unique supermodular implementation. This is the
next proposition. I defer the proof to Section 9.1.
Proposition 3 Let V and scf f = (x, t) be such that (V, x) has δ-increasing differences.
Let Vi and xi be C
2, and Vi ◦ xi be ωi-Lipschitz in θˆi. Letting
κi = max
j 6=i
max
(θˆ,θi)∈Θ×Θi
(
∂2Vi(xi(θˆ), θi)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
− min
θi∈Θi
∂2Vi(xi(θˆ), θi)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
)
,
if κi < δi/(n− 1), then (x, t∗) is uniquely TSBI.
There are examples where it is straightforward to use Theorem 4 and Proposition 3.
Consider the public goods example of Section 2. Recall that N = {1, 2}, X = [0, 2],
Θi = [0, 1] for i = 1, 2. Agents’ valuation functions are V1(x, θ1) = θ1x − x2 and
V2(x, θ2) = θ2x + x
2/2. The decision rule is x(θ) = θ1 + θ2. Since ∂xi(θ)/∂θi =
1 and ∂2Vi(x, θi)/∂x∂θi = 1 for i = 1, 2, it implies δi = 1, i = 1, 2. Moreover,
∂2Vi(x(θˆ), θi)/∂θˆ1θˆ2 = −2 if i = 1 and 1 otherwise. So, κi = 0 for i = 1, 2. By
Proposition 3, (x, t∗) is uniquely supermodular implementable.
Remark: Neither unique nor optimal supermodular implementation implies the other.
The truthful equilibrium may be unique, although the transfers do not generate the
weakest complementarities. And the supermodular transfers could be optimal but the
truthful equilibrium not unique.
The rest of this subsection deals with the multiple equilibrium problem under the
budget balance condition. The next proposition shows that there are scf that are uniquely
supermodular implementable with balanced transfers. It gives sufficient conditions in
order that the transfers identified in Theorem 2 yield truthtelling as a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Let n ≥ 3. Let V and decision rule x(.) be C1 such that (V, x) has δ-
increasing differences and x(.) is allocation-efficient. Suppose Vi ◦ xi has complements
bounded by τi and substitutes bounded by Ti. If τi − Ti < δi/(n − 1), then (x, tBB) is
uniquely TSBI.
The proof is in Section 9.1. The public goods example of Section 2 again provides a nice
illustration. Consider the same setting with an additional player, player 3, such that
Θ3 = [0, 1], V3(x, θ3) = θ3x and x(θ) = θ1 + θ2 + θ3. Then δi = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3. Since
τi = Ti for i = 1, 2, 3 and T1 = −2, T2 = 1, T3 = 0, Proposition 4 says that for any {ρi}
such that 2 < ρ1 < 2
1
2
, −1 < ρ2 < −12 , 0 < ρ3 < 12 , (x, tBB) is uniquely supermodular
implementable with budget balancing.
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5.4 Discussion
Optimal supermodular implementation can be viewed as an intermediary form of im-
plementation between strictly-dominant strategy and Bayesian implementation. If the
composition of any player’s valuation function with the decision rule has strictly increas-
ing differences in type and own announcement, Mookherjee and Reichelstein [41] im-
plies that there exist transfers resulting in strictly-dominant strategy implementation.23
The existence of strictly-dominant strategies in a game implies that each player’s best-
response has zero slope. But under the assumption on the composition, the slope of the
best-response is given by the ratio between the cross-partials and the second-derivative
in own announcement. So the game induced by these transfers will have null complemen-
tarities, that is, the cross-partials of any player’s utility in equilibrium will be zero. As
optimal supermodular implementation induces the supermodular game with the weakest
complementarities, optimal transfers will belong to the same ºID-equivalence class as the
transfers that yield strictly-dominant strategy implementation. If such transfers do not
exist, then it will assign the “best Bayesian transfers.”
The public goods example of Section 2 illustrates this point. The composition of 1
or 2’s valuation function with the decision rule has strictly increasing differences in type
and announcement. Therefore, it is not surprising that the scf be uniquely supermodu-
lar implementable. What is more surprising is that the optimal transfers transform the
expected externality mechanism into dominant-strategy transfers. Note also that it is
easy to find examples of scf falling into Theorem 4 or Proposition 3 that are not even
dominant strategy implementable. Even if Mookherjee and Reichelstein [41] applies, my
results may provide a whole range of transfers compatible with unique supermodular
implementation, whereas the choice is narrow for dominant strategy implementation.24
Optimal implementation is based on the idea of imposing the minimal amount of
complementarities (w.r.t ºID) necessary for supermodular implementation. But weak
complementarities might imply a low speed of convergence of learning dynamics towards
truthtelling. This is not necessarily true. Convergence is indeed fastest under strictly-
dominant strategy implementation, a form of implementation with null complementari-
ties.
Finally, there may be a conflict in supermodular implementation between budget bal-
ancing and the multiple equilibrium problem. If transfers t are balanced, then
∑
k∈N
∂2tk(θˆ)/∂θˆi∂θˆj = 0 for all θˆ and any distinct i and j. But there is no reason a priori for
optimal transfers to satisfy this condition. Optimal transfers indeed require some func-
tional flexibility to minimize complementarities over all announcements, and the budget
balance condition sometimes prevents it by imposing the above restriction. Beyond jar-
gon, it seems to suggest a trade-off between learning and full efficiency. One may argue
that a second-best approach could be appropriate: Choosing what is best among what
players can learn.
23See Proposition 2 in Mookherjee and Reichelstein [41] and the discussion that follows.
24In the public goods example, Theorem 4 implies that there are infinitely many ρ1 and ρ2 resulting
in unique supermodular implementation; but it must be that ρ1 = 2 and ρ2 = −1 to achieve strictly-
dominant strategy implementation.
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6 Applications
6.1 Principal-Agent Problem
Consider the traditional principal-agent problem with hidden information.25 A prin-
cipal contracts with n agents. Agent i’s type space is [θi, θi]. Types are independently
distributed according to a common prior φ = ×φi which admits a bounded density with
full support. Let Xi ⊂ R be compact. Each agent i exerts some observable effort xi ∈ Xi,
and she bears a cost or disutility ci(xi, θi) of producing effort xi when she is of type θi.
From the vector of efforts x = (x1, . . . , xn), the principal receives utility w(x). The prin-
cipal faces the problem of designing an optimal contract subject to incentive constraints
and reservation utility constraints for the agents. A contract is a function that maps
each possible agents’ type into effort and transfer levels. The principal’s problem can be
stated as
(x∗(θ), t(θ)) ∈ argmax
f=(x,t)
Eθ[w(x
∗(θ))−
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)] (18)
subject to
Eθ−i [ti(θi, θ−i)− ci(x∗i (θi, θ−i), θi)] ≥ Eθ−i [ti(θ′i, θ−i)− ci(x∗i (θ′i, θ−i), θi)], ∀ θ′i, θi (19)
Eθ−i [ti(θi, θ−i)− ci(x∗i (θi, θ−i), θi)] ≥ ui, ∀ θi (20)
Condition (19) requires the scf (x∗, t) to be truthfully Bayesian implementable. Condi-
tion (20) is an interim participation constraint, as agents may opt out of the mechanism
if it does not meet their reservation utility.
Assume that the underlying functions w, ci and φ are such that x
∗ is dimensionally
reducible26 and t is continuous. If ci is twice-continuously differentiable on Xi × Θi,
Theorem 3 applies. There are transfers t∗ such that (x∗, t∗) is optimally supermodular
implementable and solves (18) subject to (19) and (20).
At this level of generality, it is difficult to appreciate the strength of optimal su-
permodular implementation, so I present a simple application in the spirit of the team
production model of McAfee and McMillan [34].
There are two agents, 1 and 2, whose types are independently uniformly distributed
over [0, 3]. Players exert some effort to produce an observable contribution xi. The
amount of effort ei necessary to give xi is e1(x, θ1) = (3 − θ1)(x1 − x2) + x1 and
e2(x, θ2) = (3− θ2)(x2+ x1). Larger contributions require larger effort and higher ability
levels decrease marginal effort. But agent 2 generates positive externalities on her coun-
terpart, whereas 1 has negative externalities. Given x = (x1, . . . , xn), the principal only
knows the density f(y|x) of output y given x. The principal has utility function u(y, x, θ)
and she perceives costs as cp(x, θ). The problem is
x∗(θ) ∈ argmax
(x1,...,xn)
Ey|x[u(y, x, θ)]− cp(x, θ). (21)
Each agent’s valuation function is Vi(x, θi) = −c(ei(x, θi)) where c(ei) = ei. Assume u,
cp and f are such that the decision rule obtained from (21) is (x
∗
1(θ), x
∗
2(θ)) = (θ2θ1 −
25See e.g Section 23.F in Mas-Colell et al. [35].
26Recall that x∗ is dimensionally-reducible if it is twice-continuously differentiable and satisfies some
mild dimension condition.
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θ1E(θ2), θ2− θ1).27 Decision rule x∗(.) satisfies the conditions of Proposition 6 of Section
9.1, and so there exists transfers t such that (x∗, t) is TBI. Constructing optimal transfers
from (14) and (15) gives t∗1(θˆ) = −θˆ21/2−3θˆ1+4θˆ2θˆ1 and t∗2(θˆ) = −5θˆ22/4+3θˆ2+3θˆ2θˆ1. It
turns out that truthtelling is the unique Bayesian equilibrium in the supermodular game
G induced by the mechanism with optimal transfers.
6.2 Approximate Supermodular Implementation: Auctions and
Public Goods
In this subsection, I apply the theory of supermodular implementation to public
goods, and then I describe two binary-choice models that violate bounded substitutes
(and continuity) for continuous type spaces. I circumvent this difficulty by using approx-
imate or virtual implementation (Abreu and Matsushima [3], Duggan [16]).
Consider an economy with n consumers and two commodities, one public x ∈ [0, x]
and one private. The consumers each have preferences for the public good and trans-
fer ti of the private good that can be represented by the function ui(x, ti, θi) where
θi ∈ [θi, θi] is i’s type. Preferences are assumed to be quasilinear in the private good:
ui(x, ti, θi) = Vi(x, θi)+ti. An allocation is a (n+1)-tuple of the form (x, t1, . . . , tn). In the
public goods environment, the appropriate social choice function for a utilitarian planner
is the mapping (x∗(θ), t(θ)) ∈ argmaxf=(x,t)
∑
i∈N Vi(x, θi) + ti subject to
∑
i∈N ti(θ) ≤ 0
for all θ. If (V, x) ∈ Fcont and the substitutes are bounded, then Theorem 2 implies that
(x∗, tBB) is supermodular implementable such that tBB balances budget. In the public
goods example of Section 2, (x∗, tBB) is actually uniquely supermodular implementable
with budget balance.
Next I describe two binary-choice models that violate bounded substitutes (and conti-
nuity) for continuous type spaces. The first is an auction model where a seller is awarding
one unit of an indivisible good to the highest bidder. The second is a public goods model
where agents have to choose whether to undertake a public project. These models repre-
sent a challenge for the present theory, unless type spaces are finite, in which case Theo-
rem 1 always applies. I use approximate or virtual implementation to solve this difficulty
(Abreu and Matsushima [3], Duggan [16]). A scf is approximately implementable if, in
any ²-neighborhood of that scf, there exists an implementable scf. This requires a notion
of distance that will be defined later. The main idea is that the set of twice-continuously
differentiable functions is dense in the Lp-space and twice-continuously differentiable sat-
isfy the bounded substitutes assumption on smooth domains.
There is a seller of an object who derives no value from it, and n potential buyers.
Let buyer i’s type space be Θi ≡ [θi, θi]. Buyer i’s utility function takes the linear form
ui(xi, θi) = θixi + ti. Consider the allocation-efficient decision rule which attributes the
good to the agent with the highest type. For i ∈ N and all θ,
x∗i (θ) =
{
1 if θi ≥ max{θj : j ∈ N}
0 otherwise
and
∑
j∈N
x∗j(θ) = 1 (22)
27The one-dimensional condensation property of Mookherjee and Reichelstein [41] is violated. There
exists no h1 : X → R such that c(e1(x, θ1)) = D1(h1(x), θ1) for some D1 : R × Θ1 → R. Moreover,
note that V1(x∗(θˆ), θ1) does not have increasing differences in (θˆ1, θ1), so x∗(.) is not dominant-strategy
implementable by Definition 5 in Mookherjee and Reichelstein [41].
22
For N = {1, 2}, I explain why substitutes are unbounded. Note that for any θ′′2 > θ′′1 >
θ′2 > θ
′
1, x1(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
2)− x1(θ′1, θ′′2)− x1(θ′′1 , θ′2)+ x1(θ′1, θ′2) = −1. Hence, for substitutes to be
bounded, there must exist T such that −θ1 ≥ T (θ′′1 − θ′1)(θ′′2 − θ′2) for all θ1 ∈ Θ1. But
this is clearly impossible as we can maintain the order θ′′2 > θ
′′
1 > θ
′
2 > θ
′
1 while θ
′
1 ↑ θ′2
and θ′′1 ↓ θ′2. So, Proposition 1 does not apply.
Consider now a situation in which n agents must decide whether to undertake a public
project whose cost is c. The decision rule x(.) takes values in {0, 1}. Let agent i’s type
space be Θi ≡ [θi, θi]. Agents’ utility function takes the same linear form. Consider the
allocation-efficient decision rule defined as follows. For a particular i ∈ N and all θ,
x∗(θ) =
{
1 if
∑
i∈N θi ≥ c
0 otherwise
(23)
Once again, for N = {1, 2}, substitutes are unbounded. Take any θ′′2 > θ′2 and let
θ′1 = −θ′2 + c − 1/n and θ′′1 = −θ′2 + c + 1/n. Then for n large enough, x1(θ′′1 , θ′′2) −
x1(θ
′
1, θ
′′
2)−x1(θ′′1 , θ′2)+x1(θ′1, θ′2) = −1. There cannot exist T such that −θ1 ≥ 2Tn (θ′′2−θ′2)
for all n. Proposition 1 does not apply.
Clearly, the problem is caused by the lack of smoothness in those decision rules.
However, if one is willing to accept an ²-inefficiency in the process, then supermodular
implementation applies.
Definition 7 A decision rule x(.) is approximately TSBI with transfers, if there exists
a sequence of optimally TSBI scf {(x², t²)} such that, for 1 ≤ p < ∞, lim²→0(
∫
Θ
|x²,i −
xi|p)
1
p = 0 for all i.
The next result says that, for 1 ≤ p < ∞, Lp-decision rules are approximately super-
modular implementable on C2-domains.
Proposition 5 Let the valuation functions V be C2 such that ∂Vi(xi, θi)/∂θi is in-
creasing in xi. If xi,k(.) ∈ Lp(Θ,R) is increasing in θˆi for each k = 1, . . . ,mi, and
Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)] is continuous in (θˆi, θi), then x(.) is approximately TSBI.
Proof: Recall that V and x(.) are C2, if there exist open sets Oi ⊃ Θi and Ui ⊃ Xi,
i = 1, . . . , n, such that V : Ui × Oi → R and x :
∏
i∈N Oi → Ui are C2. For any θ ∈ O,
let ι1(θ) = {j ∈ N : θj ∈ [θj, θj]}, ι2(θ) = {j ∈ N : θj < θj} and ι3(θ) = {j ∈ N :
θj > θj}. Define the extension of x(.) from Θ to O, denoted xe, such that for all θ ∈ O,
xe(i,k)(θ) = x(i,k)(((θj)ι1(θ), (θj)ι2(θ), (θj)ι3(θ))) for all k and i ∈ N . So, xe(i,k) is an increasing
function in θi and x
e
(i,k) ∈ Lp(O,R). Since the space of C2-functions on O is norm
dense in Lp(O,R), there exists a sequence {x²(.)} of C2-functions from O into R such
that lim²→0(
∫
O
|x²,(i,k) − xe(i,k)|p)1/p = 0 for all k and i. This implies lim²→0(
∫
Θ
|x²,(i,k) −
x(i,k)|p)1/p = 0 for all k and all i. Moreover, we can take {x²(.)} such that x²,(i,k)(.) is
increasing in θi on Oi for all k and i. Therefore, since Vi and x²,i are both C
2 and each
Θi is compact, (V, x²) ∈ Fcont, ∂Eθ−i [Vi(x²,(i,k)(θˆ), θi)]/∂θi = Eθ−i [∂Vi(x²,(i,k)(θˆ), θi)/∂θi]
is increasing in θˆi on Θi, and substitutes are bounded. Thus, Proposition 1 and Theorem
3 imply that, for all ² > 0, there exist tSM² such that f = (x², t
SM
² ) is TSBI. Q.E.D
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It follows as a corollary of Proposition 5 that, in the above auction and public goods
settings, the efficient decision rules are approximately supermodular implementable.
In the environment of Proposition 5, it is not clear whether we should use approxi-
mate supermodular implementation. On the one hand, the conditions of the proposition
imply dominant strategy implementability by Mookherjee and Reichelstein [41]. But in
the induced game, dominant strategy implementation does not prevent adaptive dynam-
ics from converging to an “unwanted” dominant strategy equilibrium, a “non-dominant”
strategy equilibrium, a non-equilibrium profile, or simply from cycling. On the other
hand, approximate supermodular implementation relies on optimal supermodular im-
plementation. But even if optimal implementation performs well along the sequence,
it remains approximate and not exact implementation; this dilemma seems to support
Cabrales [7]’s argument that there is a trade-off between close implementability and
stability or learning.
7 A Revelation Principle for Supermodular Bayesian
Implementation
Supermodular Bayesian implementation is permissive in quasilinear environments
with real type spaces. Although these assumptions are common in mechanism design
and allow for a wide range of applications, it is important to consider general utility
functions and type sets. One of the first questions that come to mind is that of the
restrictiveness of direct mechanisms. The traditional Revelation Principle says that di-
rect mechanisms cause no loss of generality in Bayesian (weak) implementation. How
restrictive are direct mechanisms in supermodular Bayesian implementation?
Answering this question is particularly relevant, because the challenge in any super-
modular design problem is to specify an ordered message space and an outcome function
so that agents adopt monotone best-responding behaviors. The set of all possible mes-
sage spaces and orders on those spaces is so large that it might seem intractably-complex.
A Supermodular Revelation Principle gives conditions so that, if a scf is supermodular
implementable, then there exists a direct-revelation mechanism that supermodularly im-
plements this scf truthfully. So it is a technical insight that reduces the space of mecha-
nisms to consider to the space of direct-revelation mechanisms. The question is complex
because it is combinatorial in essence; it pertains to the existence of orders on type spaces
that make the induced game supermodular.
The following example shows that, unfortunately, there exist supermodular imple-
mentable scf that are not truthfully supermodular implementable. Nevertheless a su-
permodular revelation principle exists. Although it is not as general as the traditional
revelation principle, it measures the restriction imposed by direct mechanisms in super-
modular implementation and gives conditions that may warrant their use.
Consider two agents, 1 and 2, with type spaces Θ1 = {θ11, θ21} and Θ2 = {θ12, θ22, θ32}. Prior
beliefs assign equal probabilities to all θ ∈ Θ. Let X = {x1, . . . , x12} be the outcome
space. Agent 1’s preferences are given by utility function u1(xn, θ1) such that:
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12
u1(xn, θ
1
1) −10 0 16 −13 −2 33 −21 −2 18 −19 0 36
u1(xn, θ
2
1) −10 0 16 −21 −2 18 −13 −2 33 −19 0 36
For simplicity, let u2 be a constant function. Suppose that the agents wish to supermod-
ularly implement the scf f defined as follows
f(., .) θ12 θ
2
2 θ
3
2
θ11 x4 x5 x6
θ21 x7 x8 x9
Consider the following indirect mechanism Γ = ((M1,º1), (M2,º2), g). Agent 1’s mes-
sage space is M1 = {m1,m11, m21, m1}; º1 is such that m11 and m21 are unordered, m1
is the greatest element and m1 is the smallest element. Agent 2’s message space is
M2 = {m2,m12,m2}; º2 is such that m2 º m12 º2 m2. The outcome function g is defined
as follows
g(., .) m2 m
1
2 m2
m1 x1 x2 x3
m11 f(θ
1
1, θ
1
2) f(θ
1
1, θ
2
2) f(θ
1
1, θ
3
2)
m21 f(θ
2
1, θ
1
2) f(θ
2
1, θ
2
2) f(θ
2
1, θ
3
2)
m1 x10 x11 x12
I show that mechanism Γ supermodularly implements f in Bayesian equilibrium. Given
u2 is constant, any strategym2 : Θ2 →M2 is a best-response to any strategy of 1. So, con-
sider strategy m∗2(.) such that m
∗
2(θ
1
2) = m2, m
∗
2(θ
2
2) = m
1
2 and m
∗
2(θ
3
2) = m2. Since for all
m1 we have
∑
m2
u1(g(m
1
1,m2), θ
1
1) >
∑
m2
u1(g(m
1,m2), θ
1
1) and
∑
m2
u1(g(m
2
1,m2), θ
2
1) >∑
m2
u1(g(m1,m2), θ
2
1), 1’s best-response m
∗
1(.) to m
∗
2(.) must be such that m
∗
1(θ
1
1) = m
1
1
and m∗1(θ
2
1) = m
2
1. So, (m
∗
1(.),m
∗
2(.)) is a Bayesian equilibrium such that g ◦ m∗ = f .
Moreover, for each θ1, u1(g(m1,m2), θ1) is supermodular in m1 and has increasing differ-
ences in (m1,m2). Since Σ1(Θ1) is endowed with the pointwise order, u
g
1(m1(.),m2(.))
is supermodular in m1(.) and has increasing differences in (m1(.),m2(.)). Therefore, Γ
supermodularly implements f in Bayesian equilibrium, because 2’s utility is constant.
Does this imply that there exists a mechanism ({(Θi,≥i)}, f) which truthfully imple-
ments f in supermodular game form? By means of contradiction, suppose there is such
a mechanism. Then (Θ1,≥1) must be totally ordered, for otherwise Σ1(Θ1) cannot be a
lattice. So, assume θ21 >1 θ
1
1. Let θ
k
i (.) be the strategy where agent i always announces
type θki regardless of her true type. Let θ
T
1 (.) be the truthful strategy for 1 and let θ
L
1 (.)
be constant lying. Note θT1 (.), θ
L
1 (.) >1 θ
1
1(.). Moreover, since Σ2(Θ2) is a lattice, θ
1
2 and
θ22 (and thus θ
1
2(.) and θ
2
2(.)) must be ordered.
Since the direct mechanism must induce a supermodular game, uf1(θˆ1(.), θˆ2(.)) must
satisfy the single-crossing property in (θˆ1(.), θˆ2(.)).
28 Given
−2 = uf1(θT1 (.), θ22(.)) ≥ uf1(θ11(.), θ22(.)) = −2
−13 = uf1(θT1 (.), θ12(.)) > uf1(θ11(.), θ12(.)) = −17
uf1 satisfies the single-crossing property in (θˆ1(.), θˆ2(.)) only if θ
1
2 >2 θ
2
2. But
−2 = uf1(θL1 (.), θ22(.)) ≥ uf1(θ11(.), θ22(.)) = −2
28The single-crossing property, defined in Section 3, is implied by increasing differences.
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does not imply −21 = uf1(θL1 (.), θ12(.)) ≥ uf1(θ11(.), θ12(.)) = −17. The single-crossing
property is violated. Now assume θ11 >1 θ
2
1. Note θ
1
1(.) >1 θ
T
1 (.), θ
L
1 (.). Given
−2 = uf1(θ11(.), θ22(.)) ≥ uf1(θL1 (.), θ22(.)) = −2
−17 = uf1(θ11(.), θ12(.)) > uf1(θL1 (.), θ12(.)) = −21
uf1 satisfies the single-crossing property in (θˆ1(.), θˆ2(.)) only if θ
1
2 >2 θ
2
2. But
−2 = uf1(θ11(.), θ22(.)) ≥ uf1(θT1 (.), θ22(.)) = −2
does not imply −17 = uf1(θ11(.), θ12(.)) ≥ uf1(θT1 (.), θ12(.)) = −13. The single-crossing prop-
erty is violated. The scf f is not truthfully supermodular implementable, although it is
supermodular implementable.
Even though the revelation principle fails to hold in general for supermodular imple-
mentation, a supermodular revelation principle exists, as captured by the next theorem.
The proof appears in Section 9.2. This result shows that the problem which arises in the
example is that the range of the equilibrium strategies is not a lattice.
Theorem 5 (The Supermodular Revelation Principle for Finite Types) Let type
space Θi be a finite set for i ∈ N . If there exists a mechanism ({(Mi,ºi)}, g) that
supermodularly implements the scf f such that there is a Bayesian equilibrium m∗(.) for
which g ◦m∗ = f and m∗i (Θi) is a lattice, then f is TSBI.
Corollary 3 Let type space Θi be a finite set for i ∈ N . If there exists a mechanism
({(Mi,ºi)}, g) that supermodularly implements the scf f such that there is a Bayesian
equilibrium m∗(.) for which g ◦m∗ = f and (Mi,ºi) is totally ordered for all i ∈ N , then
f is TSBI.
According to the supermodular revelation principle, limiting attention to direct mech-
anisms is equivalent to restricting one’s scope to mechanisms where the equilibrium
strategies are lattice-ranged. It is a rather strong result that supermodularity can be
transmitted to the game induced by a direct mechanism. The range of the equilibrium
strategies is the transmission channel. If this range is a lattice, then it is possible to
construct an order such that each player’s type space is order-isomorphic to the range
of her equilibrium strategy. The properties of the utility functions ensue. Besides, the
theorem states conditions that are verifiable a posteriori. It may be useful to know when
a complex mechanism can be replaced with a simpler direct mechanism.
Corollary 3 says that if the designer is only interested in mechanisms where the mes-
sage spaces are totally ordered, then she can look at direct mechanisms only without loss
of generality.
The above example suggests that the conditions of Theorem 5 are somewhat mini-
mally sufficient. Agent 1’s equilibrium strategy is indeed not lattice-ranged and the scf is
not truthfully supermodular implementable. Whereas this example might indicate that
the pointwise-order structure causes revelation to fail, this is not the case. Theorem 6
of Section 9.2 suggests that allowing more general order structures does not weaken the
conditions for a revelation principle. Those theorems only give sufficient conditions for
revelation principles; but in those cases where a supermodular direct mechanism exists
while the conditions are violated, the existence of an order has little or nothing to do
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with a revelation principle.29
Theorem 5 is concerned with finite type spaces. Under this assumption, if a player’s
type space is a (complete) lattice, then so is her set of deceptions with the pointwise
order. This is no longer true for continuous types. Continuity and measurability become
issues (Van Zandt [50]). In Section 9.2, I generalize the definition of supermodular im-
plementability to incorporate orders that are not pointwise orders. This allows to prove
a supermodular revelation principle for continuous types.30
8 Conclusion
This paper introduces a theory of implementation where the mechanisms that imple-
ment a scf must induce a supermodular game. Supermodular Bayesian implementation
differs from previous literature in terms of its methodology and explicit purpose. Unlike
the traditional approach, the present mechanisms derive their properties from the game
that they induce and not from the solution concept. The paper shows that the analysis
in mechanism design and implementation theory can benefit from this methodology. It
may also prove useful in other contexts. The theory explicitly aims to improve learning
and stability in an incentive-design framework.
The paper raises issues that have not been discussed. For the most part, type spaces
are subsets of the real line. It is not straightforward to extend the theory to multidimen-
sional type spaces. When types are real, supermodularity in a player’s own type is trivial.
For multidimensional types, it is not immediate that the current technique of modifying
a mechanism applies. In this case, we possibly have to add complementarities between
the dimension of a player’s type without affecting the incentives. Similar transforma-
tions will not preserve the incentives. The condition of bounded substitutes will also
have to be applied to the transfers of the original mechanism. Those transfers were triv-
ially supermodular with real types, but they may carry substitutes in multidimensional
types. For this reason and the following, indirect mechanisms seem appropriate in a su-
permodular implementation framework; yet the paper only considers direct mechanisms.
Since the supermodular revelation principle fails in general, weak implementation calls
for indirect mechanisms. So, indirect mechanisms are important to extend the frontiers
of supermodular implementation in quasilinear and general environments. However weak
implementation makes the issue of the interval prediction essential, so indirect mecha-
nisms should be considered in the context of optimal or unique implementation.
The multiple equilibrium problem in supermodular implementation suggests an alter-
native solution, namely strong implementation. Strong implementation requires all the
equilibria of the mechanisms to yield desired outcomes. Instead of relying on weak im-
plementation, supermodular implementation could be based on strong implementation,
which would also call for indirect mechanisms. Nonetheless, even under strong imple-
mentation, learning dynamics may cycle within the interval prediction or players may
learn to play a non-equilibrium profile. Therefore, strong supermodular implementation
29In the spirit of Echenique [18], there may be conditions on the scf and the utility functions such
that an order exists for which the game is supermodular. Since this existence would not follow from
implementability, it is not a revelation approach.
30See Theorem 6 of Section 9.2.
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cannot substitute for unique supermodular implementation. Yet it is an avenue to ex-
plore.
Like many Bayesian mechanisms, the present mechanisms are parametric in the sense
that they rely on agents’ prior beliefs. Thus the designer uses information other than
that received from the agents (Hurwicz [25]). It may be interesting to design non-
parametric supermodular mechanisms. This is yet another justification for indirect
mechanisms, as nonparametric direct Bayesian mechanisms impose dominant-strategy
incentive-compatibility (Ledyard [32]).
Finally, it is important to pursue testing supermodular games. Since supermodular
Bayesian implementation provides a general framework, it is a good candidate for ex-
perimental tests. From a practical viewpoint, discretizing type spaces may simplify the
players’ task of announcing deceptions at each round. But there are also simple environ-
ments with continuous types where announcing a deception is equivalent to choosing a
real number in a compact interval. For instance, in the public goods example of Section
2, announcing an optimal deception comes down to choosing an intercept in a compact
set;31 this is also the case in the team-production example of Section 6.1 where optimal
deceptions are characterized by their positive slope.
9 Proofs
9.1 Quasilinear Environments
The next lemma shows that if the complete information payoffs are supermodular
and have increasing differences, then the ex-ante payoffs are supermodular and have
increasing differences.
Lemma 1 Assume (Mi,≥i) is a lattice for i ∈ N . Suppose that, for each θi ∈ Θi,
ui(g(mi,m−i, θi)) is supermodular in mi for each m−i and has increasing differences in
(mi,m−i). Then u
g
i is supermodular in mi(.) ∈ Σi(Mi) for each m−i(.) and has increasing
differences in (mi(.),m−i(.)) ∈ Σi(Mi)×
∏
j 6=iΣj(Mj).
The proof is omitted because it is simple.
The proof of the next Proposition is also omitted, because the result is standard and
its proof is similar to that of Proposition 23.D.2 in Mas-Colell et al. [35].
Proposition 6 Consider a quasilinear family of utilities and a decision rule x(.) such
that Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)] is continuous in (θˆi, θi).
(i)If the scf f=(x, t) is truthfully Bayesian implementable, then for all θˆi
Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] = −Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θˆi)] +
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Eθ−i [Vi(xi(s, θ−i), s)]
∂θi
ds + ²(θi) (24)
(ii) Let the decision rule x(.) be such that ∂Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)]/∂θi is increasing in θˆi
for each θi and i ∈ N . If transfers t satisfy (24), then the scf f = (x, t) is TBI.
31See Equations 1 and 2.
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Proof of Theorem 4: By way of contradiction, suppose that the truthful equilibrium
is not the unique Bayesian equilibrium. Since the scf is TSBI, there exist a greatest
and a smallest equilibrium in the game induced by the mechanism. So, one of these
extremal equilibria must be strictly greater/smaller than the truthful one. Suppose
that the greatest equilibrium, denoted (θi(.))i∈N ∈
∏
Σi(Θi), is strictly greater than
the truthful equilibrium. That is, for all i ∈ N , θi(θi) ≥ θi for a.e θi, and there exists
N∗ 6= ∅ such that, for all i ∈ N∗, θi(θi) > θi for all θi in some subset of types with
positive measure.
I evaluate the first-order condition of agent i’s maximization program at the greatest
equilibrium; then, I bound it from above by an expression which cannot be positive for all
players (hence the contradiction). Consider player i’s interim utility for type θi against
θ−i(.):
Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i(θ−i)), θi)] + Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i(θ−i))]. (25)
Since Vi ◦ xi and ti are (resp.) ωi- and βi-Lipschitz and both differentiable in θˆi for all
θˆ−i, we can apply the Bounded Convergence Theorem to show that for any deception
θˆ−i(.) the first-derivative of (25) with respect to θˆi is
Eθ−i
[
∂Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i(θ−i)), θi)
∂θˆi
]
+ Eθ−i
[
∂ti(θˆi, θ−i(θ−i))
∂θˆi
]
. (26)
Since ui ◦ f has complements bounded by κi, we have
Eθ−i
[
∂Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i(θ−i)), θi)
∂θˆi
+
∂ti(θˆi, θ−i(θ−i))
∂θˆi
− ∂Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)
∂θˆi
− ∂ti(θˆi, θ−i)
∂θˆi
]
(27)
≤
∫
Θ−i
κi
∑
j 6=i
(θj(θj)− θj)φ−i(θ−i)dθ−i = κi
∑
j 6=i
Eθj [θj(θj)− θj] (28)
By (27) and (28),
(26) ≤ κi
∑
j 6=i
Eθj [θj(θj)− θj] + Eθ−i
[
∂Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)
∂θˆi
]
+ Eθ−i
[
∂ti(θˆi, θ−i)
∂θˆi
]
. (29)
By part (i) of Proposition 6,
Eθ−i
[
∂ti(θˆi, θ−i)
∂θˆi
]
= −Eθ−i
∂Vi(xi(θ′i, θ−i), θˆi)
∂θ′i
∣∣∣∣∣
θ′i=θˆi
 .
Therefore, (29) implies
(26) ≤ κi
∑
j 6=i
Eθj [θj(θj)− θj] + Eθ−i
[
∂Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)
∂θˆi
− ∂Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θˆi)
∂θ′i
]
. (30)
If, as claimed, it is optimal for each player i to play θi(θi) for a.e type θi, then the RHS
of (30) evaluated at θˆi = θi(θi) must be positive for a.e θi and all i ∈ N . To see why,
let Θ∗i ⊂ Θi be the set of types θi for which the RHS of (30) is strictly negative when
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evaluated at θˆi = θi(θi). Note that Θ
∗
i is measurable by definition, because the RHS of
(30) is a measurable function in θi when θˆi = θi(θi). By way of contradiction, suppose
there is a player i ∈ N for whom Θ∗i has strictly positive measure. Since the RHS of (30)
is greater than (26), if θˆi = θi(θi) then (26) is strictly negative for all θi ∈ Θ∗i . But for
types θi ∈ Θ∗i , [θi, θi(θi)] is available to player i. Thus there exists ε > 0 for which the
deception θ∗i : Θi → Θi defined as θ∗i (θi) = θi(θi)− ε1Θ∗i for all θi gives i a strictly greater
utility than θi(.). Notice θ
∗
i (.) ∈ Σi(Θi) because θi(.) ∈ Σi(Θi), so θ∗i (.) improves on θi(.)
which is a contradiction. As a result, Θ∗i has null measure.
Since it is optimal for each player i to play θi(θi) for a.e type θi, the RHS of (30)
at θˆi = θi(θi) is positive for a.e θi and all i ∈ N . However, this leads to the following
contradiction. If the RHS of (30) is positive for a.e θi, then
0 ≤ κi
∑
j 6=i
Eθj [θj(θj)− θj]+Eθi
[
∂Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θi(θi), θ−i), θi)]
∂θˆi
−
−∂Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θi(θi), θ−i), θi(θi))]
∂θˆi
]
≤ κi
∑
j 6=i
Eθj [θj(θj)− θj] + δiEθi [θi − θi(θi)] for all i ∈ N, (31)
where the last inequality follows from δi-increasing differences. Since κi/δi < 1/(n − 1)
by hypothesis and φj has full support for all j, (31) implies∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1Eθj [θj(θj)− θj] ≥ Eθi [θi(θi)− θi] for all i ∈ N, and∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1Eθj [θj(θj)− θj] > Eθi [θi(θi)− θi] for all i ∈ {i : {j 6= i} ∩N
∗ 6= ∅}.
Hence ∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1Eθj [θj(θj)− θj] >
∑
i∈N
Eθi [θi(θi)− θi]
which is a contradiction because both sides are equal by definition. It is not optimal for
all i ∈ N to play θˆi = θi(θi) for a.e θi. Thus, there is no equilibrium that is greater than
the truthful equilibrium. The same argument applies to show that there is no equilibrium
that is smaller than the truthful equilibrium. Truth-revealing is the unique equilibrium.
Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 3: The family of valuation functions and the scf have δ-increasing
differences, which implies that ∂Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)]/∂θi is strictly increasing in θˆi.
Given (14), let transfers be t∗i as in (15) where ti is taken to be (11). So, given
Eθ−i [Vi(xi(θˆi, θ−i), θi)] is continuous in (θˆi, θi) by assumption, Proposition 6 and The-
orem 3 imply (x, t∗) is TSBI. Both Vi ◦ xi and t∗i are C2, hence it follows that ui ◦ f has
bounded complements. The bound κi on complements is computed as follows,
κi = max
j 6=i
max
(θˆ,θi)∈Θ×Θi
(
∂2Vi(xi(θˆ), θi)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
− min
θi∈Θi
∂2Vi(xi(θˆ), θi)
∂θˆi∂θˆj
)
.
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As C2-functions, transfers t∗i are βi-Lipschitz in θˆi. Applying Theorem 4 completes the
proof. Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 2: Let
hi(θˆ−i) = −
(
1
n− 1
)∑
j 6=i
Eθ˜−j
[∑
k 6=j
Vk(x(θˆj, θ˜−j), θ˜k)
]
,
and for ρi ∈ R, let
δi(θˆi, θˆ−i) =
∑
j 6=i
ρiθˆiθˆj.
Define
tBBi (θˆi, θˆ−i) = δi(θˆi, θˆ−i)− Eθ−i [δi(θˆi, θ−i)] + Eθ˜−i
[∑
j 6=i
Vj(x(θˆi, θ˜−i), θ˜j)
]
+ hi(θˆ−i)−
− 1
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
ρj θˆj θˆk +
1
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
ρj θˆjE(θk). (32)
First, (x, tBB) is TBI, because x(.) is allocation-efficient and
Eθ−i [t
BB
i (θˆi, θ−i)] = Eθ˜−i
[∑
j 6=i
Vj(x(θˆi, θ˜−i), θ˜j)
]
+ Eθ−i [hi(θ−i)],
which is the expectation of the transfers in the expected externality mechanism (Arrow
[5] and d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet [15]). Second, note that for all θ,∑
i∈N
δi(θi, θ−i)− 1
n− 2
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
ρjθjθk =
∑
i∈N
δi(θi, θ−i)− 1
n− 2
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
(n−2)ρiθiθj = 0
and
1
n− 2
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
ρjθjE(θk)−
∑
i∈N
Eθ−i [δi(θi, θ−i)] =
=
1
n− 2
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
(n− 2)ρiθiE(θj)−
∑
i∈N
Eθ−i [δi(θi, θ−i)] = 0,
hence ∑
i∈N
tBBi (θ) =
∑
i∈N
Eθ˜−i
[∑
j 6=i
Vj(x(θi, θ˜−i), θ˜j)
]
+
∑
i∈N
hi(θ−i) = 0,
because transfers are balanced in the expected externality mechanism. Furthermore, tBBi
is clearly continuous in θˆ−i for each θˆi and usc in θˆi for each θˆ−i. It follows from standard
arguments that Eθ[t
SM
i (θˆi(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))] is continuous in θˆ−i(.) and usc in θˆi(.). Next I
show that it is possible to take ρi so that the complete information payoffs have increasing
differences in (θˆi, θˆ−i). By assumption, there exists a lower bound Ti on the substitutes
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from Vi ◦ xi(.). Set ρi > −Ti. Choose any θ′′−i ≥−i θ′−i and pick any θ′′i > θ′i. Given (32),
notice
tBBi (θ
′′
i , θ
′′
−i)− tBBi (θ′′i , θ′−i)− tBBi (θ′i, θ′′−i) + tBBi (θ′i, θ′−i) =
= δi(θ
′′
i , θ
′′
−i)− δi(θ′′i , θ′−i)− δi(θ′i, θ′′−i) + δi(θ′i, θ′−i). (33)
Therefore, ui(xi(θˆi, θˆ−i), θi) has increasing differences in (θˆi, θˆ−i) for all θi, if the following
expression is positive for each θi,
Vi(xi(θ
′′
i , θ
′′
−i),θi) + Vi(xi(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), θi)− Vi(xi(θ′′i , θ′−i),θi)− Vi(xi(θ′i, θ′′−i), θi)
+
∑
j 6=i
ρi
(
θ′′i θ
′′
j + θ
′
iθ
′
j − θ′′i θ′j − θ′iθ′′j
)
. (34)
The proof then follows similarly to that of Theorem 1. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 4: Since τi − Ti < δi/(n − 1), there is ρi > −Ti such that
ρi + τi < δi/(n − 1). By Theorem 2, (x, tBB) is supermodular implementable whenever
ρi > −Ti. Because Vi ◦xi(.) has complements bounded by τi, the definition of tBBi implies
that ui ◦ f has complements bounded by ρi+ τi. Theorem 4 applies, which completes the
proof. Q.E.D
9.2 Supermodular Revelation Principles
Lemma 2 Let (X,≥) be a complete lattice. For Y ⊃ X, let φ : X →→ Y be a corre-
spondence whose range is Y and such that, for all x ∈ X, x ∈ φ(x) and for all x′ 6= x,
φ(x′) ∩ φ(x) = ∅. Then, there exists an extension ≥∗ of ≥ such that:
(i) (Y,≥∗) is a complete lattice,
(ii) For all distinct x, x′ ∈ X, and all y ∈ φ(x), y′ ∈ φ(x′), y ≥∗ y′ iff x ≥ x′,
(iii) For all x ∈ X, φ(x) is a complete chain.
Proof: Define ≥∗ on Y such that (ii) is satisfied. That is, for all distinct x, x′ ∈ X, and
all y ∈ φ(x), y′ ∈ φ(x′), x ≥ x′ if and only if y ≥∗ y′. By the Well Ordering Principle
of set theory, for all x ∈ X, there exists º on φ(x) such that (φ(x),º) is a chain, and
any B ⊂ φ(x) has a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound in φ(x).32 For each
x ∈ X, define ≥∗ to be equal to º on φ(x). Therefore, for all x ∈ X, φ(x) is a complete
chain and (iii) is satisfied. I show next that (Y,≥∗) is a complete lattice with the order
≥∗ just defined on all of Y .
First, I prove that it is a partially ordered set. For all x ∈ X, x ∈ φ(x) and thus
x ≥∗ x because (φ(x),≥∗) is a chain. This proves reflexivity. Now take x, y, z ∈ Y such
that x ≥∗ y and y ≥∗ z. If x ∈ φ(x′), y ∈ φ(y′) and z ∈ φ(z′) where x′, y′, z′ are pairwise
distinct in X, then x ≥∗ y implies x′ > y′ and y ≥∗ z implies y′ > z′. By transitivity of
32Take ω ∈ φ(x). By the Well Ordering Principle, there is an order that well orders φ(x)\{ω}. Extend
this order to all of φ(x) by setting ω as the greatest element. Let º be the extension. Since (φ(x),º) is
also well ordered, infφ(x)(S) exists for any S ⊂ φ(x). Since the set of upper bounds of S contains ω, it
has a least element because φ(x) is well ordered. Hence supφ(x)(S) exists.
32
≥, we have x′ > z′, which implies x ≥∗ z. Suppose that x, y ∈ φ(x′) and z ∈ φ(z′) for
distinct x′, z′ ∈ X. Since y ≥∗ z, we have x′ > z′ which implies x ≥∗ z. If x, y, z ∈ φ(x′),
then x ≥∗ z because (φ(x),≥∗) is a chain, which completes the proof of transitivity.
Now, if x ≥∗ y and y ≥∗ x for some x ∈ φ(x′) and y ∈ φ(y′), then x′ = y′. Therefore,
x, y ∈ φ(x′) and so x = y because (φ(x′),≥∗) is a chain. This establishes antisymmetry
of ≥∗.
Secondly, I prove that (Y,≥∗) is a complete lattice. For any subset S ⊂ Y , I show
that supY S and infY S exist. Let X be such that x ∈ X ⊂ X if and only if S ∩φ(x) 6= ∅.
If |X | = 1, then S ⊂ φ(x) where x is the unique element of X . By definition of ≥∗, S has
an infimum and a supremum in φ(x) ⊂ Y . Now assume |X | ≥ 2 and let S(x) = S ∩φ(x)
for all x ∈ X. Note {S(x)}x∈X forms a partition of S. Define s(x) = supY S(x) and
s(x) = infY S(x) which exist and are in φ(x) for all x ∈ X by definition of ≥∗. Note that
if supY S and infY S exist, then supY S ≡ supY (∪X s(x)) and infY S ≡ infY (∪X s(x)) by
associativity. Since (X,≥) is a complete lattice, supX X exists; call it x. If x ∈ X , then
s(x) = supY (∪X s(x)) and so supY S exists. So suppose x /∈ X and define s∗ = infY φ(x).
Note s∗ ∈ φ(x) is well-defined by definition of ≥∗. I show s∗ = supY (∪X s(x)). Since
x /∈ X , x > x for all x ∈ X . This implies s∗ ≥∗ s(x) for all x ∈ X . Hence s∗ is an
upper bound for ∪X s(x). Take any upper bound y 6= s∗ for ∪X s(x). Then y /∈ ∪X s(x),
for if there were x′ ∈ X such that y = s(x′) then x′ ≥ x for all x ∈ X would imply that
x ≡ supX X = x′ is in X , a contradiction. Therefore, y ∈ φ(x˜) for some x˜ ∈ X\X and
since y ≥∗ s(x) for all x ∈ X , x˜ > x for all x ∈ X . Hence x˜ ≥ x. If x˜ 6= x, then y >∗ s∗,
and if x˜ = x, then y ∈ φ(x) implies y ≥∗ s∗. As a result, s∗ = supY (∪X s(x)). Finally,
infY S exists by a similar argument. Since (X,≥) is a complete lattice, infX X exists; call
it x. If x ∈ X , then infY (∪X s(x)) = s(x). Otherwise infY (∪X s(x)) = supY φ(x). Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 5: By the traditional revelation principle, (Θ, f) truthfully imple-
ments f in Bayesian equilibrium with any order on Θi. It remains to prove that there
is an order ≥∗i on Θi such that the game induced by ({(Θ,≥∗i )}, f) is supermodular. I
prove first that, for any i ∈ N , the order ºi on Mi induces an order ≥∗i on Θi such that
(Θi,≥∗i ) is a (complete) lattice. So, Σi(Θi) is a (complete) lattice with the pointwise
order. Second, I establish that under ≥∗i , ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) is supermodular in θˆi(.) and
has increasing differences in (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)).
Denote M∗i = m
∗
i (Θi) for all i ∈ N . For each mi ∈ M∗i , define the equivalence class
[mi] = {θi ∈ Θi : m∗i (θi) = mi}. Let θs : M∗i → Θi be a selection from the corre-
spondence [ ] : M∗i →→ Θi. As a mapping from M∗i to θs(M∗i ), θs is a bijection because
mi 6= m′i necessarily implies [mi] ∩ [m′i] = ∅, given that m∗i (.) is single-valued. Since θs
is a bijection, we can define ≥i on a subset of Θi such that θs(m′′i ) ≥i θs(m′i) if and only
if m′′i ºi m′i where m′′i ,m′i ∈ m∗i (Θi). Because θs is an order-isomorphism from (M∗i ,ºi)
to (θs(M∗i ),≥i), it preserves all existing joins and meets. This implies that (θs(M∗i ),≥i)
is a (complete) lattice because (M∗i ,ºi) is a (complete) lattice. Define the extension ≥∗i
(or simply ≥∗) of ≥i to all of Θi, as follows:
1. For any mi,m
′
i ∈ M∗i with mi 6= m′i and for all θi ∈ [mi], θ′i ∈ [m′i], then θi ≥∗ θ′i if
and only if θs(mi) ≥i θs(m′i).
2. For all mi ∈ M∗i , ([mi],≥∗) is a chain such that any subset B ⊂ [mi] has a least
upper bound and a greatest lower bound in [mi].
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By Lemma 2, (Θi,≥∗) is a (complete) lattice. Thus, Σi(Θi) is a (complete) lattice with
the pointwise order. Endow those lattices with their order-interval topology and the
Borel σ-algebra so that all functions are trivially continuous and measurable.
Proving thatm∗i (.) preserves meets and joins will be useful in the last step of the proof.
Take any T ⊂ Θi. Since (M∗i ,ºi) and (Θi,≥∗) are complete lattices, supM∗i (m∗i (T )) and
supΘi T exist. Denote mT = supM∗i (m
∗
i (T )). Since supΘi T is an upper bound for T , ≥∗
implies m∗i (supΘi T ) is an upper bound for m
∗
i (T ) in M
∗
i . Thus, m
∗
i (supΘi T ) ºi mT .
But mT is an upper bound for m
∗
i (T ), hence sup[mT ]([mT ]) is an upper bound for T .
So, sup[mT ]([mT ]) ≥∗ supΘi T , and therefore, mT ºi m∗i (supΘi T ). A similar argument
applies to show infM∗i(m
∗
i (T )) = m
∗
i (infΘi T ).
Now I show that ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) is supermodular in θˆi(.) and has increasing differences
in (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)). Take any i ∈ N and for all j 6= i, endow Θj with ≥∗j and Σj(Θj) with
the corresponding pointwise order. Endow
∏
Σj(Θj) with the product order. The first
step is to show that ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) is supermodular in θˆi(.). For any θ
′′
i (.) and θ
′
i(.), we
know m∗i (θ
′
i(.)) ∨m∗i (θ′′i (.)) = m∗i (θ′i(.) ∨ θ′′i (.)) and similarly for ∧. Since the mechanism
({(Mi,ºi)}, g) supermodularly implements f , ugi (mi(.),m−i(.)) is supermodular in mi(.)
for each m−i(.). For any θˆ−i(.),
ugi (m
∗
i (θ
′
i(.) ∨ θ′′i (.)),m∗−i(θˆ−i(.))) + ugi (m∗i (θ′i(.) ∧ θ′′i (.)),m∗−i(θˆ−i(.)))
≥ ugi (m∗i (θ′i(.)),m∗−i(θˆ−i(.))) + ugi (m∗i (θ′′i (.)),m∗−i(θˆ−i(.))),
which implies that for any θˆ−i(.),
ufi (θ
′
i(.) ∨ θ′′i (.), θˆ−i(.)) + ufi (θ′i(.) ∧ θ′′i (.), θˆ−i(.)) ≥ ufi (θ′i(.), θˆ−i(.)) + ufi (θ′′i (.), θˆ−i(.)).
The second step is to show that ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) has increasing differences in (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)).
For any θ′′i (.) ≥∗i θ′i(.) and θ′′−i(.) ≥∗−i θ′−i(.), we know m∗i (θ′′i (.)) ºi m∗i (θ′i(.)) and
m∗−i(θ
′′
−i(.)) º−i m∗−i(θ′−i(.)). Since the mechanism ({(Mi,ºi)}, g) supermodular im-
plements f , ugi (mi(.),m−i(.)) has increasing differences in (mi(.),m−i(.)). For any θi,
ugi (m
∗
i (θ
′′
i (.)),m
∗
−i(θ
′′
−i(.)))− ugi (m∗i (θ′i(.)),m∗−i(θ′′−i(.))) ≥
≥ ugi (m∗i (θ′′i (.)),m∗−i(θ′−i(.)))− ugi (m∗i (θ′i(.)),m∗−i(θ′−i(.))),
which implies that for any θi,
ufi (θ
′′
i (.), θ
′′
−i(.))− ufi (θ′i(.), θ′′−i(.)) ≥ ufi (θ′′i (.), θ′−i(.))− ufi (θ′′i (.), θ′−i(.)),
and completes the proof. Q.E.D
For the next theorem, consider a slightly different framework from that of Section 4.
A mechanism is a pair Γ = (M, g). The Bayesian game induced by mechanism Γ is
G = (N, {(Σi(Mi),ºi)}, ug) where ug = (ugi ) is the vector of ex-ante payoffs and ºi is
some order on Σi(Mi). A mechanism supermodularly implements a scf if it Bayesian
implements that scf such that for all i ∈ N there exists an order ºi on Σi(Mi) for
which G is supermodular. A scf is supermodular Bayesian implementable if there exists
a mechanism Γ that supermodularly implements it. The only difference with Definition
2 is that ºi need not be a pointwise order.
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Theorem 6 (SupermodularRevelation Principle for Continuous Types) If there
exists a mechanism (M, g) that supermodularly implements the scf f such that there is
a Bayesian equilibrium m∗(.) for which g ◦m∗ = f and m∗i (Σi(Θi)) is a complete lattice
for all i ∈ N , then f is TSBI.
Proof: The proof unfolds similarly to that of Theorem 5, except that continuity and mea-
surability have to be dealt with. By the traditional revelation principle, (Θ, f) truthfully
implements f in Bayesian equilibrium with any order on Σi(Θi). I prove first that, for
any i ∈ N , the order ºi on Σi(Mi) induces an order ≥i on Σi(Θi) such that (Σi(Θi),≥i)
is a complete lattice. Second, I show that for all i ∈ N , ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) is continuous in
θˆ−i(.) for each θˆi(.), and upper-semicontinuous in θˆi(.) for each θˆ−i(.). Third, I establish
that under ≥∗i , ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) is supermodular in θˆi(.) and has increasing differences in
(θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)).
Let M∗i = m
∗
i (Σi(Θi)). For each mi(.) ∈ M∗i , define the equivalence class [mi(.)] =
{θi(.) ∈ Σi(Θi) : m∗i (θi(.)) = mi(.)}. Let θs : M∗i → Σi(Θi) be a selection from the
correspondence [ ] : M∗i →→ Σi(Θi). As a mapping from M∗i to θs(M∗i ), θs is a bijection,
so we can define ≥i such that θs(m′′i (.)) ≥i θs(m′i(.)) if and only if m′′i (.) ºi m′i(.) where
m′′i (.),m
′
i(.) ∈ M∗i . Because θs is an order-isomorphism from (M∗i ,ºi) to (θs(M∗i ),≥i),
(θs(M∗i ),≥i) is a complete lattice. Define the extension ≥∗i (or simply ≥∗) of ≥i to all of
Σi(Θi) as follows:
1. For any mi(.),m
′
i(.) ∈ M∗i with mi(.) 6= m′i(.) and for all θi(.) ∈ [mi(.)], θ′i(.) ∈
[m′i(.)], then θi(.) ≥∗ θ′i(.) if and only if θs(mi(.)) ≥i θs(m′i(.)).
2. For all mi(.) ∈ M∗i , ([mi(.)],≥∗) is a chain such that any subset B ⊂ [mi(.)] has a
least upper bound and a greatest lower bound in [mi(.)].
By Lemma 2, (Σi(Θi),≥∗) is a complete lattice.
A similar argument to that of Theorem 5 establishes that m∗i : (Σi(Θi),≥∗) →
(Σi(Mi),ºi) preserves meets and joins.
The topological properties will follow from continuity of the equilibrium strategies.
Recall m∗i : (Σi(Θi),≥∗, τ ∗i )→ (Σi(Mi),ºi, τi) where τ ∗i and τi are order-interval topolo-
gies. Take V ∈ τi. So, V = ∪λ∈Λ ∩nλi=1 [aλ,i, bλ,i]c and thus,
m∗−1i (V ) = ∪λ∈Λ ∩nλi=1 (m∗−1i ([aλ,i, bλ,i]))c. (35)
Since M∗i is a complete lattice, mλ,i ≡ infM∗i ([aλ,i, bλ,i]∩M∗i ) and mλ,i ≡ supM∗i ([aλ,i, bλ,i]∩M∗i ) exist. Since (Σi(Θi),≥∗) is a complete lattice, infΣi(Θi)([mλ,i]) and supΣi(Θi)([mλ,i])
exist. By definition of ≥∗, m∗−1i ([aλ,i, bλ,i]) = [infΣi(Θi)([mλ,i]), supΣi(Θi)([mλ,i])], which is
closed in τ ∗i . By (35), m
∗−1
i (V ) is open.
I prove that for all i ∈ N , ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) is continuous in θˆ−i(.) for each θˆi(.), and
upper-semicontinuous in θˆi(.) for each θˆ−i(.). Take any net {θα−i(.)} → θ∗−i(.). Since
m∗−i(.) is continuous, {m∗−i(θα−i(.))} → m∗−i(θ∗−i(.)). Given ugi (mi(.),m−i(.)) is continuous
in m−i(.) for each mi(.),
limα u
f
i (θˆi(.), θ
α
−i(.)) = limα u
g
i (m
∗
i (θˆi(.)),m
∗
−i(θ
α
−i(.)))
= ugi (m
∗
i (θˆi(.)),m
∗
−i(θ
∗
−i(.)))
= ufi (θˆi(.), θ
∗
−i(.)).
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Hence, for all i ∈ N , ufi is continuous in θˆ−i(.) for each θˆi(.). The same argument applies
to establish upper-semicontinuity in θˆi(.) for each θˆ−i(.).
Proving that ufi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) is supermodular in θˆi(.) and has increasing differences
in (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) is analogous to Theorem 5, because m∗i : (Σi(θi),≥i) → (m∗i (Σi(θi),ºi)
preserves meets and joins. Q.E.D
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